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This thesis examines the theory and practice of sustaining peace after an intrastate 
conflict. After an agreed-upon peace settlement is signed, certain factors support 
sustaining the peace, and for this study those factors are analyzed to develop 
recommendations for implementation in Colombia. Drawing from literature on peace 
settlements and case studies, the thesis posits that the positive factors for sustainable 
peace be employed to function as a plan to deter a recurrence of intrastate conflict. The 
thesis tests these factors through analysis of the period following civil wars in Angola and 
Mozambique and finds that political inclusion and public security are particularly 
important. In Colombia, the Marines, along with the backing of the United States Armed 
Forces, will aim to sustain the peace through collaboration. Building on these findings, 
this thesis recommends ensuring that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) and security sector reforms (SSR) are the foundations for sustaining the peace.  
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U.S. foreign policy officials consider Plan Colombia to be one of the most 
successful foreign relations projects undertaken over the last 15 years. As the Colombian 
peace process hoped to end almost 50 years of internal conflict, negotiations continued in 
Cuba between the Government of Colombia and the nation’s largest guerrilla group, the 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The current negotiations for 
achieving a peace settlement have been ongoing for almost four years, beginning in 2012 
and reaching an initial agreement on August 26, 2016. Unfortunately, after a national 
referendum vote, the Colombian people did not ratify the initial agreement. In response, 
the Colombian government has included the opposing group, led by former President 
Uribe, to the current talks to attempt a final consensus. On November 12, 2016, all parties 
in the peace talks reached a finalized agreement for implementation. The United States 
and Colombia are optimistic about the eventual success of the peace talks. Nevertheless, 
the United States will continue to support the continuity of security gains that have been 
accomplished from Plan Colombia, in the event the agreement does not lead to peace. 
While most nations that experience intrastate conflict revert back to conflict, U.S. support 
strengthens the possibility of peace. During the conflict aftermath, the role of the 
Colombian Marines will be even more crucial, backed by U.S. Armed Forces, in 
supporting those factors that make a negotiated settlement into a lasting peace.  
After the negotiated peace settlement, the security and stability of Colombia will 
not be automatic. It will require time and a sustained effort by the nation of Colombia. 
The security needs of Colombia are a prerequisite of a lasting peace. While the military 
and police forces will need to be ready and able to ensure stability; reforms will also be 
needed to reflect the changing environment. As the peace process has come to a close and 
a peace accord agreed upon, the military forces will be required to transition from active 
engagement in a bloody internal conflict to supporting the changing environment and 
maintaining the peace. During this period, though, the militaries’ combat readiness must 
be maintained, if internal conflict persists.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the factors for successful and failed transitions to peace after a 
negotiated settlement, and how can the Colombian Marines backed by the U.S. Armed 
Forces support civil authorities to sustain the peace and avoid the recurrence of intrastate 
conflict? 
B. ARGUMENT 
To end an intrastate conflict and achieve a durable peace, the parties involved can 
take one of two courses. Both entail an imbalance of power; that is, one party will be in a 
more dominant position. First, through a military victory, in which one of the sides, either 
the government or the rebels, defeats the other and assumes complete control over the 
government. In this option, the losing side must abide by the rules imposed on them by 
the victor. The defeated party does not have any option other than to comply, because if 
the defeated party acts counter to this, it could face complete annihilation.  
Another way to end an intrastate conflict is through a negotiated peace settlement. 
Normally the negotiated settlement takes place after many years of war, since warring 
parties have not been able to defeat their counterpart. Following this course to peace, a 
government must consider many factors that can influence the outcome when choosing to 
end a conflict. Such factors include the duration of war, the number of deaths caused by 
acts of terrorism, and the magnitude of the destruction that terrorism has generated. When 
government officials and decision makers seek to end a conflict through a negotiated 
agreement with groups, including terrorists and insurgent organizations intent on harming 
citizens of their own nation, they must weigh these factors.  
Typically, warring parties arrive at the negotiating table with the expectation of 
achieving more in the way of their own self-interests than was obtained through the 
outcome of the conflict. The expectation of the government is to maintain political or 
economic power, while rebel groups expect to gain legal access to the government in the 
hope of obtaining exclusive privileges, namely gaining control over certain segments of 
the population, territory, and government institutions. The timeframe for negotiations 
depends on the objectives warring parties want to achieve. The negotiations can last 
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months or even years, which is the case with Colombia. The Colombian government and 
the FARC have been negotiating for four years. However, the duration of time does not 
matter as much as the outcome. The final expectation for nations that have experienced 
intrastate conflict and chosen to end hostilities through negotiation is to achieve a lasting 
and sustainable peace.  
Although a negotiated peace settlement can be difficult to achieve, it brings hope 
to a war-torn nation and can support the more difficult goal of achieving an enduring 
peace. The spirit of hope that arises when an agreement is reached can vanish quickly if 
expectations are not met when the agreement is implemented. During the implementation 
process, parties to the agreement may begin to lose motivation when they realize the 
difficulties that must be overcome to realize the goals of the agreement. Over time, the 
interests of the conflicting groups may surface and cause a breach in the agreement, 
motivating the parties to return to war. However, extra effort has to be put forth by 
former warring parties to remain committed to maintaining peace. In particular, the 
government in the conflict aftermath must work hard to reduce the factors that influenced 
the onset of hostilities.  
The same factors that initiated the onset of conflict, if not rectified, have the 
potential to persist and lead to another outbreak of hostilities. We found that such factors 
commonly include political exclusion, ethnic fragmentation, economic grievances, greed, 
and weakness of the state, which are widely known to trigger civil wars and their 
recurrence. To ensure that peace prevails after a negotiated settlement, the parties 
involved in the negotiations must be required to achieve a durable peace. It is important 
to note that the most successful transitions to peace are those that do not depend on a 
third party, but rather on commitments between previous enemies. For example, 
commitments made by the government must be kept. Therefore, if the government 
chooses to use the armed forces to protect ex-combatants who give up their arms and 
place their trust in the government, the government must provide them with that security.  
The promise of protecting ex-combatants is one of the most difficult for the 
military during the implementation of the agreements. The government must foster an 
environment in which demobilized ex-combatants will no longer have nor need their 
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weapons for self-protection. Thus, demobilized ex-combatants must feel the negotiated 
agreement between the government and former rebel leaders delivers on a fundamental 
aspect of trust, thereby demonstrating the ability of the government to achieve its 
constitutional obligation to provide adequate protection. Trust between the parties is a 
long and fragile process, but it is a key element to sustain the peace.  
After Colombia has agreed to a negotiated settlement with the FARC, there is 
much speculation over the future role of the Armed Forces during the post-conflict era. 
Some people insist on the need to reduce the size of the Armed Forces, including the 
Colombian Marines. Likewise, with the possible reduction in force size, there could be a 
decrease in operational budgets. The argument justifying these cuts is that Colombia will 
no longer be plagued by an armed insurgency. The argument is invalid when considering 
the security environment in Colombia; the FARC is not the only illegal armed group 
committing atrocities.  
The transition to a post-conflict society does not mean an immediate role change 
for the Marines or for the support that the Marines provide to the National Police. The 
Marines need to continue to supplement the Colombian National Police, especially in 
rural and poorer areas remote from the principle urban centers. Another effort after the 
peace deal is agreed upon will be for the Marines to support the Demobilization, 
Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process by securing FARC assembly areas and 
preparing to fight a possible recurrence of hostilities by armed groups seeking to 
overthrow the government. The Colombian Marines cannot give up the capabilities to 
face an unconventional enemy, under the assumption internal threats will no longer exist. 
Many skills that have been acquired through fighting an unconventional war by the 
Colombian Marines over many years of internal conflict. In any scenario, the state and 
the Colombian people will continue to need the Armed Forces, not only to defend the 
territory but to ensure the country’s economic development, by safeguarding the 
democracy and protecting natural resources. A secure environment is necessary for 
political and economic wellbeing in Colombia’s post–conflict era. 
The United States will be a guarantor of peace in Colombia by monitoring the 
progress towards implementing the peace accords and ensuring the factors that initially 
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led to unrest and conflict are addressed. Since Colombia is a major security partner in the 
western hemisphere and benefactor of successful foreign policy by the United States over 
the last 15 years. The security of the nation can be accomplished by continuing the 
policies from Plan Colombia; however, the armed forces must evolve to meet new 
challenges that lay ahead. The U.S. military should support Colombia with foreign aid, 
credit to purchase up-to-date weaponry, and send U.S. personnel to advise and assist in 
reconstruction efforts. For a sustainable peace to take hold, the U.S. Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) working as an interagency command, should conduct a full 
assessment in conjunction with the American Embassy in Bogota, and the 
USMILGROUP collaboratively with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to determine all 
possible support to transition from conflict to peace. With support from the United States, 
Colombia’s security institutions—the Armed Forces and the National Police—must 
transform to meet the needs of the new environment. By continuing to ensure a strong 
security environment, the government ensures that the political and economic wellbeing 
of the nation can be achieved in Colombia’s post–conflict era. 
C. BACKGROUND 
In order to determine the factors related to a durable peace and how the 
Colombian Marines and U.S. Military can support those factors, this thesis examines the 
theory and practice of the persistence of peace, primarily after a negotiated settlement. 
We accomplished this by reviewing current literature on sustaining peace after negotiated 
settlements and case studies demonstrating a successful and a failed attempt at the non-
recurrence in conflict. The integration of case study analysis and current literature on 
sustaining peace sheds light on the outcomes of non-recurrence of internal conflict after a 
negotiated peace process. This provides clearer insight into the outcomes of selected case 
studies as a means to predict similar circumstances in the future post-peace process in 
Colombia. 
When the current peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the 
FARC began in November 2012, the Colombian Government was looking at “the end of 
more than 50 years of conflict in Colombia,” according to statements by Colombian 
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President Juan Manuel Santos.1 According to scholars such as Quackenbush, Hirotaka, 
Call, Hartzell, Doyle, Sambanis, and Walter, who have addressed the issue of how to end 
an internal conflict, as with any nation, Colombia would have two basic ways to end its 
internal conflict. The first is through military victory, either by the sovereign nation’s 
government or by a rebel group. The second is a negotiated peace agreement between the 
parties in conflict. In the case of Colombia, the more preferred solution would be through 
a negotiated settlement. In Havana, Cuba, the Colombian Government and the FARC are 
continuing peace talks even after a national referendum voted against the initial 
settlement. Therefore, one of the objectives of this work is to study more deeply the 
theories behind the negotiated settlement and their application to the Colombian scenario, 
to foresee a durable peace or the possibility for the recurrence of conflict.  
Barbara Walter, Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego and an expert on 
International Security with an emphasis on civil war, demonstrated the first pattern of 
recurrence of conflict by stating: 
Some data suggests that internal conflicts have a surprisingly high 
recidivism rate of the 103 countries that experienced some form of internal 
conflict between 1991–2009, from minor to major conflict, only 44 
avoided a subsequent return to internal conflict. That means that 56 
percent of all countries that suffered from one internal conflict during this 
period experienced at least one conflict thereafter.2 
Walter’s study underscores the importance of studying those nations that have not 
had a recurrence of internal conflict and could support the exploration of potential 
conditions derived from her analysis. 
When peace follows a military victory, it is more durable because the winning 
side can establish the rules and conditions for the subsequent peace. The defeated side 
cannot impose anything, because it is not strong enough to do so, and must conform to 
the measures imposed by the winning side. When peace is achieved through a negotiated 
                                                 
1 “Cronologia del Proceso de Paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC,” [chronology of the peace process 
between the Government and the FARC] Revista Semana, September 23, 2015, http://www.semana.com/
nacion/articulo/linea-de-tiempo-del-proceso-de-paz-de-las-farc-gobierno/443570-3 
2 Barbara Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-conflict Peace,” The World Bank, 
September 13, 2010, 1, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/128031468182669586/pdf/
620260WP0Confl0BOX0361475B00PUBLIC0.pdf  
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settlement, the situation is different. Theories claim that the probability of returning to 
conflict after such agreements is very high. 
After a negotiated settlement, different causes can generate the recurrence of 
conflict, and Mason, Walter, Brandt, and Quinn have devoted themselves to studying 
those causes and factors. Among the possible causes, we find that initially what leads to 
an internal conflict persists after reaching a negotiated settlement. In the event either 
party fails to comply with the agreements, especially on the issue of power sharing, 
recurrence of conflict is high. Another cause arises from inadequate security for former 
rebel forces. Often they do not find an environment that supports their transition to lawful 
activities, whether political or economic. Last, a motivating objective of our work is to 
gain a better understanding of those factors that lead to the recurrence of internal conflict 
after a negotiated settlement and how to avoid those circumstances. 
Our examination of the Angola civil war case study assesses the measures taken 
to avoid the recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated peace settlement. We have 
found Angola is a success story for persistent peace after a negotiated settlement when 
the government holds a majority of the power. Additionally, an examination of 
Mozambique’s civil war is a case study to assess the failures that occurred after a 
negotiated settlement and more than 20 years of relative peace. Presumably, the cases of 
Angola and Mozambique have similarities to Colombia’s experience, demonstrating the 
effect of limited and unrestricted involvement from the international community. 
The integrated approach using Angola and Mozambique as case studies and game 
theory proved useful in this study. The security sector reform (SSR) institutions defined 
for the purposes of this study are the military and police forces. Many nations do not 
know the role their host nation militaries’ should take following a negotiated peace 
settlement. For this reason, our findings develop a framework for implementation by 
these militaries. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Multiple studies consider the causes of and measures taken to avoid the 
recurrence of civil war. The research for this literature review identified two main 
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transitional processes resulting in the termination of internal conflict. The principal one is 
civil wars ending in a military victory, and the other is the more complicated process 
associated with a negotiated settlement in the absence of a clear military victory. During 
the course of this literature review, we reveal the current theories behind these two 
processes and case studies. One case demonstrates a positive outcome of non-renewal of 
hostilities in one nation, and the other focuses on renewed hostilities after two decades of 
peace. In Colombia, there are multiple examples of attempts at moving forward with a 
negotiated settlement, which could have led to a potentially successful transition to peace 
over the last 30 years. The theory used in this review focuses on identifying factors for a 
successful transition from conflict to achieving a durable peace. 
1. Ending Civil Wars 
The theoretical argument for ending civil wars has consistently shown that when a 
victor imposes its will, the result is a more stable security environment than in a 
negotiated peace settlement.3 The victors from military action are likely to be fulfilled 
with the post-settlement status quo, and the losers are less likely (being too weak after 
outright defeat) to challenge the new state of affairs by initiating another conflict. 
Furthermore, there is much less likelihood of a power-sharing relationship under an 
imposed settlement, when the victor ensures that defeated party’s ability to renew the 
conflict is diminished. Considering this, the theoretical basis and evidence supports the 
stability of imposed settlements, rather than other types.4 The two different processes for 
preventing the recurrence of civil war are emphasized by their definitions: “military 
victory is a war termination in which one side defeats or eliminates the other side.”5 
When there is a military victory, the conqueror destroys the capability of the loser and 
denies the defeated party the use of arms, making it possible to prevent the loser from re-
initiating a civil war. The author of the definition argues that military victory is more 
                                                 
3 Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher, “Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of 
Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 (November 2008): 725. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Hirotaka Ohmura, “Termination and Recurrence of Civil War: Which Outcomes Lead to Durable 
Peace after Civil War?,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 12, no 3 (December 2011): 376, doi: 
10.1017/S146810991100017X. Emphasis added. 
 9
likely to lead to stable peace than a negotiated peace settlement, because through victory 
the balance of power becomes imbalanced between the parties involved.6 
The principal process related to our research question is the prevention of internal 
conflict recurrence through peace negotiation, a process that is presently under way 
between the Colombian Government and FARC. This process is defined as a “negotiated 
peace settlement in a war termination, in which the government and rebel group(s) agree 
to stop fighting and resolve the issue of civil war, and adopt a comprehensive formal 
treaty on the form of government and post-war recovery.”7 This process ends in failure 
when there is a lack of genuine commitment by the disadvantaged party abiding by the 
agreement and increases the likelihood of peace settlement failure. This hypothesis 
suggests that the failure of peace settlement implementation results from the combatants’ 
inability to provide a credible commitment to uphold the agreement. This lack of 
commitment may be attributed to structural features such as quasi anarchy, which means 
that “no central government exists to ensure implementation of order or law.”8 Next, 
peace agreements require a rebel group to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) into 
society, while the nation has to look at SSR or the evolving nature of the security 
environment. This is accomplished by making the necessary changes in a post-conflict 
environment to ensure the state’s security apparatus is meeting new challenges. 
According to Walter, “those states that are willing to resolve key rebel grievances 
are believed to have an increased expectation of avoiding renewed violence rather than 
those governments that leave important issues unresolved.”9 Once the primary motivation 
for inspiring a rebel movement has diminished, the group should disintegrate, effectively 
ending the conflict. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 378. 
7 Ibid., 376. Emphasis added. 
8 Ibid., 379. 
9 Barbara Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 373. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/213133021?accountid=12702. 
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2. Peace Preservation in a Post-Negotiated Settlement 
This section will better define how to preserve the peace after the completion of a 
negotiated settlement. The following sections include power sharing, peacekeeping, and 
economic development.  
a. Power Sharing 
A major factor in resolving the issues that a rebel organization may have in peace 
negotiations is to establish an agreement of power sharing as a system of governance in 
which the rebel parties involved in the conflict are granted a role.10 This can be 
accomplished through allocated offices in the state for participation in administrative, 
elected, or appointed positions. The intention is to remedy discriminatory actions and 
listen to the rebel groups’ needs for recognition as being distinct with a right for 
guaranteed representation, legislative votes, and possibly territorial devolution.11 The 
need for power sharing is expressed by the statement that, “Agreements that preserve 
adversaries’ organizations and call for them to share power will stabilize the peace by 
providing rivals with a stake in the state and by making it difficult for opponents to use 
force to alter war-ending bargains.”12 
Caroline Hartzell, a professor in the Department of Political Science at Gettysburg 
College, and Matthew Hoddie, an associate professor in the Department of Political 
Science at Towson University, hypothesize that 
the adoption of power-sharing measures by rival factions can help to 
extend the peace, and argue that these provisions can be used to stabilize 
expectations and reduce uncertainty. When adversaries agree to share 
power, this action can prolong the peace by providing rival groups a stake 
in their own future. The rationalist approach to war recognizes that actors’ 
preferences are not indefinite and if or when rebel groups’ expectations 
                                                 
10 Charles Call, Why Peace Fails:Tthe Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence 
(Washington,DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 40. 
11 Karl DeRouen, Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace 
Agreements,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 4 (September 2009): 368.  
12 Caroline Hartzell, “Settling Civil Wars Armed Opponents’ Fates and the Duration of the 
Peace,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 26, no. 4 (September 2009): 348.  
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change, a settlement can become void and then challenged, including 
through a renewed use of force.13 
According to Professor Karl DeRouen, Director of the International Studies 
program at the University of Alabama, Jenna Lea, Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Alabama, and Peter Wallensteen, Senior Professor of Peace and Conflict 
Research at Sweden’s Uppsala University, observe:  
Another form of power sharing is through integrating ex-combatants into 
the military; this contributes to peace through two primary mechanisms. 
First, it can reinforce trust between the belligerent party and the 
government by countering the concern for the need of increased self-
defense, and lowering the chance military forces will be used against 
them. Second, military integration offers economic stability by providing 
employment to the rebels.14 
b. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations 
Hartzell has shown that scholars have suggested that introducing peacekeeping 
forces in the post conflict period should help to assure an enduring peace. The promise of 
a third party to provide safety and security to former combatants should serve to reassure 
them and increase their commitment to peace.15 
The literature has made it clear that intervention by the international community 
can help to sustain peace. The mere presence of peacekeeping forces is not an end-all be-
all solution, of course. There is no solution that guarantees peace, but it does support the 
outcome. The efforts of international actors to support conflict-ridden states in avoiding a 
recurrence of armed conflict are well worth the purpose for using them.16 
Peacebuilding is a phase that occurs after a peace agreement has been negotiated 
to address current hostilities and build capabilities for conflict resolution. The intent 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 350. 
14 DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen, “The Duration of Civil War Peace,” 369.  
15 Hartzell, “Settling Civil Wars,” 355. 
16 Virginia Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of 
Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (May 2004): 288. 
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behind peacebuilding is to facilitate the social, economic, and political revitalization of 
institutions and attitudes that will prevent post-conflict hostilities from being reignited.17 
c. Economic Development 
The economic environment in a post-conflict nation requires reforms to be 
enacted to stimulate economic growth and the interjection of timely international aid to 
avoid the relapse in hostilities. There is no clear solution to fix the ills of post-conflict 
economies in a short period; however, good economic policies have the opportunity to 
diminish the risk of recurrence. According to Paul Collier, from the Department of 
Economics, Oxford University, and Co-Director for the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, “Economic strategy can only complement other strategies for keeping the 
post-conflict peace.”18 Collier advocates for a dual strategy relying on economic and 
political reforms and suggests technical expertise tends to focus more on political rather 
than economic solutions due to the type of individuals commonly writing the policies. 
For countries that end their civil wars, the potential growth rate can be very high 
and during the decade following a conflict, external forces should maintain the peace, 
while pursuing economic recovery policies. Collier further argues, “the most common 
policy error of post-conflict governments is to maintain military spending around conflict 
levels.”19 A reduction in military spending can reduce the risk of further conflict and the 
resources utilized to benefit those economic policies, unless there are additional internal 
rebel groups that wish to overthrow the government. In the case of Colombia, the 
economy has the potential to benefit from peace with the FARC; however, other 
insurgent groups still threaten internal security.  
The priority for policy reforms in most post-conflict nations includes 
reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, integration of the rural economy into national 
markets, and enforcement of property rights. The post-conflict period is a time to build 
                                                 
17 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779. 
18 Paul Collier, “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery,” Department of Economics Oxford University, 
April 2006, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/IPA-PostConflictEconomicRecovery.pdf 
19 Collier, “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery,” 4 
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strong ethical business practices between public/private partnerships, which can be 
developed to enforce contract law and develop accountability among public entities. If 
strong accountability and ethical practices are cultivated early on, then a patronage 
system will have less ability to develop. 
3. The Factors Leading to a Renewed Outbreak of Civil War 
Chapter II describes the negative factors that have inevitably led to the recurrence 
of internal conflict. Different scholars have been studying the factors that influence 
parties involved in a civil war or internal war. There are seven factors. First among them 
is political exclusion, which Call argues, “Plays the decisive role in most cases of civil 
war recurrence: political exclusion acts as a trigger for renewed armed conflict.”20 The 
second is coercion. According to Sara Zukerman, “the State Coercion, caused disparate, 
apolitical organizations to form broad coalitions, radicalize and eventually endorse the 
armed alternative, providing fuel to war.”21 Ethnic discrimination is the third factor. 
According to Mehmet Gurses and Nicolas Rost, “Discrimination against an ethnic group 
whose members have been involved in a civil war against the government is an important 
factor in influencing the risk of war recurrence.”22 The fourth factor is economic 
grievances, which David Mason argues is “where more people suffer from deeper levels 
of poverty, [and] grievances are likely to be more widespread and more deeply felt, and it 
is in such environments that civil wars are most likely to occur.”23 Weak states are the 
fifth factor. Walter argues, “Civil war tends to make poor countries poorer and weak 
states weaker, encouraging additional wars over time.”24 Sixth is greed. Collier argues 
that “the war becomes a fairly lucrative business where those who have arms control the 
economic resources of a country. Where rebel organizations are financially and militarily 
                                                 
20 Call. Why Peace Fails, 4. 
21 Daly Zukerman, “The Roots of Coercion and Insurgency: Exploiting the Counterfactual Case of 
Honduras,” Conflict, Security & Development 11, no. 2 (May 2011): 147. 
22 Mehmet Gurses and Nicolas Rost, “Sustaining the Peace After Ethnic Civil Wars,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 30, no. 5 (November 2013): 485. 
23 David Mason and U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Sustaining the Peace After 
Civil War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 9. 
24 Barbara Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
59, no. 7 (2015): 2. 
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feasible, rebellions are likely to emerge, promoting whatever political agenda their 
leaders happen to support.”25 Finally, destruction from the previous civil war is a factor. 
According to Hartzell, “The wounds of civil war may be irremediable, damage to 
infrastructure may be irreparable, the cost of state recovery can be high, and recurrence in 
war surely be inevitable.”26 
E. CASE STUDIES  
The following case studies of Angola and Mozambique were chosen based on 
their similarly historical conditions to those of Colombia. Angola and Mozambique were 
colonized by Europeans from the Iberian Peninsula, and after winning their independence 
from Portugal, they were divided nations presented with a power struggle for political 
and economic governance. Their intrastate conflicts were influenced by international 
actors as proxy wars during the Cold War. We analyzed Angola’s civil war and 
experience with transitioning to peace to assess the positive factors that prevented the 
recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated peace settlement. Mozambique’s civil 
war transition to peace and subsequent recurrence to hostilities provided insight into the 
negative factors leading to renewed conflict. The initial analysis of Angola and 
Mozambique demonstrate lessons learned that can inform Colombia as it moves through 
the process towards peace and avoidance of renewed conflict.  
1. Angola 
Chapter III is a case study analysis of Angola’s transition to peace after ending 
conflict with a negotiated peace settlement and achieving a successful non-recurrence in 
hostilities. The rebel opposition group Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) was weakened by government forces, concluding in a military victory. The end 
of the Angolan intrastate conflict led to a negotiated settlement and a durable peace. After 
almost 27 years of intrastate war, the culmination was a peace accord known as the 
                                                 
25 Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” Foreign Policy 136, (May/June 2003): 42. 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/224045294?accountid=12702 
26 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: 
An Investigation of Some Key Variables,” International Organization 55, no. 01 (2001): p. 198. 
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“Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” signed in April 2002, which supplemented the 
failed 1994 Lusaka Protocol.27 The memorandum became a promise between the two 
sides that they would end the hostilities and restore peace. Earlier ceasefires in the 1980s 
and 1990s failed, but this peace agreement has been in effect for almost 14 years. 
The rebel leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, was killed in a military operation by 
the Angolan forces, which also destroyed the group’s headquarters and dozens of top 
rebel leaders. The negotiated peace deal between the Angolan Government and rebel 
group called for the demobilization of 50,000 fighters, amnesty for the combatants who 
committed crimes, and for newly held elections to determine political representation. 
There were also third-party brokers helping to oversee the deal in a joint military 
commission, represented by officials from Russia, the United States, and Portugal, which 
helped monitor the ceasefire and peace deal. 
The Angolan civil war was one of the proxy wars of the Cold War, where the 
Soviet Union and Cuban troops supported Marxist independence, and Western nations 
and South Africa supported the rebel group until its tactics became too brutal. The United 
States supported the organization until the end of the Cold War. After the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the Angolan Government slowly distanced itself from the Marxist approach 
to governance, and UNITA’s cause seemed to be futile. The state of Angola today is 
characterized by extremes in economic stratification, though the nation is rich in natural 
resources. A major portion of the population has not yet seen the benefits of the peace 
accord; however, it has been successful at sustaining the peace. 
2. Mozambique 
Chapter IV is a case study analysis demonstrating a nation that ended its civil war 
with a negotiated peace settlement, but reverted to hostilities after two decades of relative 
peace. Mozambique was embroiled in war for most of the period of 1965 to 1992. 
Although Mozambique had become a Cold War battlefront, in October 4, 1992, a peace 
accord was signed in Rome between the government of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and 
                                                 
27 “Military Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed 
November 1, 2016, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-luena-memorandum-
understanding. 
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the RENAMO. With an enduring peace that lasted almost 20 years and with a GDP 
growth rate of more than 8 percent per year, Mozambique was the prototype of a success 
story.28 The problem was that this growth was concentrated in the south of the country 
and especially in the capital, Maputo.29 Besides the economic inequality, corruption and 
political violence continued to engulf the state. Tensions between the two main 
opponents, FRELIMO and RENAMO, have weakened the country’s stability and clashes 
have once again been renewed. 
F. COLOMBIA 
Chapter V is a discussion of the Colombia’s past failed attempts at achieving 
peace. Since 1948, beginning with the death of a Colombian presidential candidate, Jorge 
Eliécer Gaitán Ayala, the country has suffered constant internal conflict. Many waves of 
violence have erupted based on an array of different “root causes.” The organizations 
taking part in the violence have run the gamut, from guerrilla groups or terrorist 
organizations to self-defense paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and other illicit 
organizations. The most notorious of these are liberal guerrilla organizations such as the 
FARC, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL), 
and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). These organizations have generated an environment 
of hopelessness in Colombia. 
Since 1948, almost all Colombian presidents have tried to reach a peace 
agreement with these groups. One of the most notorious peace talk failures in Colombia’s 
history has been the peace talk between President Andres Pastrana and the FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). 
President Andrés Pastrana was elected in 1998 and according to Kilcullen and 
Mills, he started with the pursuit of peace talks, creating a demilitarized zone centered on 
San Vicente del Caguan, including a “peace camp” at Las Pozos. However, he suspended 
the talks in February of 2002, after the guerrillas demonstrated they were no longer 
                                                 
28 Joseph Hanlon, “Bringing It All Together: A Case Study of Mozambique,”in Postconflict 
Development: Meeting New Challenges, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2005), 273. 
29 Ibid. 281. 
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willing to surrender.30 FARC essentially followed the tactic discussed earlier, “to rearm, 
resupply, and reengage” in the fight outside the demilitarized zone, exploiting the peace 
negotiation to the fullest to gain momentum by using Caguan as a vantage point to 
massively expand cocaine production and attack Colombian cities.31 
The current Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, wants peace. His 
arguments are mainly based on the length of the protracted war in Colombia, almost 50 
years since the date he took office in 2010, and the magnitude of the damage that the war 
has caused throughout all this time. Despite the military successes of recent years and the 
decline in the strategy of the FARC, this homegrown terrorist group continues to be 
financed by the drug trade. If an end to the conflict is not achieved, it is certain to 
continue the same vicious cycle of war for many more years in Colombia.  
In Chapter VI, a game theoretic analysis helps determine whether it is best for the 
interests of each side to abide by the negotiated settlement or if reverting to war is the 
best option. Last, the concluding chapter of this thesis reinforces what has been learned 
during the course of this study and offers recommendations for the implementation of the 
negotiated peace agreement to achieve a lasting peace.  
                                                 
30 David, Kilcullen and Greg Mills, “Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace. “ 
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31 Ibid.  
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II. UNSTABLE PEACE: NEGATIVE FACTORS RELATED WITH 
THE RECURRENCE OF WAR  
The relapse to civil war has become a continuous concern for those countries that 
have achieved peace through a negotiated settlement. The perfect result from such an 
agreement would be a stable and lasting peace. However, a negotiated settlement does 
not mean that a nation’s problems disappear the day after the settlement has been ratified. 
On the contrary, most of the problems that led to a civil war still persist, and in some 
cases become even worse, creating a suitable environment for new forms of violence. 
David Mason, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, explains 
the recurrence of war using a medical analogy: “A nation that has had one civil war is 
like a person who has had a heart attack. That person is more likely to have another heart 
attack than are others who share the same risk factors but have so far not had their first 
heart attack.”32 Thus, the factors that generated the outbreak of war can still persist and 
motivate a renewal of war.  
Scholars have been studying the factors that influence or have influenced parties 
involved in a negotiated settlement to return to civil war. Among these factors are: 1) 
political exclusion, 2) coercion, 3) ethnic discrimination, 4) economic grievances, 5) 
weak states, 6) greed, and 7) destruction from the previous civil war. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explain these factors and how they can promote the recurrence of war after a 
negotiated settlement. Significantly, the recurrence of war can involve one or a mixture 
of these factors. 
A. POLITICAL EXCLUSION 
Having the right of to elect and to be elected to office is fundamental to every 
human being, regardless of their social status, gender, or race. However, sometimes these 
civil liberties are not respected, and the right to participate in politics and in the decision 
making of a country is restricted. This restriction is called political exclusion. Political 
                                                 
32 David Mason and U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Sustaining the Peace After 
Civil War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 42. 
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exclusion occurs when differences exist between segments of a population, differences of 
ethnicity, economic status, and political power, among others. Segments of the 
population tend to monopolize the benefits generated by political power, therefore, 
restricting the participation of those less favored to receive the same political benefits. 
Thus, the excluded segment is restrained from any involvement in the government or 
participation in the institutions that may exist in that government.  
Political exclusion, according to Melissa Williams, Professor of Political Science 
at the University of Toronto, and Stephen Macedo, Director of the University Center for 
Human Values at Princeton, “consists in being shut out of the rights and privileges of 
membership in a community or association. More specifically political exclusion entails 
being in denial of some or all of the formal rights of citizenship, or having no effective 
access to participation in political decision making or both.”33 Generally, when a 
segment is excluded and has used all means available to obtain political inclusion, this 
segment may use weapons to gain or regain political rights that have been denied or 
restricted to them as citizens. The government or those with political power to keep their 
political benefits may use weapons against the excluded. Thus, political exclusion can be 
a factor contributing to the start of a civil war.  
After a civil war, commitments are established in a negotiated settlement to 
facilitate those excluded segments to recover the rights that were denied to them. These 
commitments include guarantees of and better conditions in which to participate 
politically. Methods of popular election become more participatory and allow a more 
meaningful representation of those segments previously discriminated against. If these 
reforms occur in a transparent way and a democratic electoral process evolves to include 
all the political parties and populations of a country, there is no reason for allegations of 
political exclusion. However, if reforms do not occur and political rights are not 
improved, settlements can fail and a relapse into war may be inevitable.  
After a negotiated agreement, parties without previous political rights usually, 
have the expectation of being fully included in the new political process of rebuilding the 
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nation. However, parties that possess greater political powers may have developed a 
sense of entitlement to more freedom when deciding to violate agreements. This often 
leads to a return to the previous stage of the settlement process; once again generating 
more resentment on the part of those who are disadvantaged. In fact, the mere perception 
of being discriminated against can be just as detrimental as actually experiencing 
discrimination or exclusion. Therefore, when one of the negotiating parties does not 
realize its political expectations in the post-conflict period, that party is likely to feel it 
has no choice but to return to war. Charles Call, Associate Professor of International 
Peace and Conflict Resolution at the American University, reaffirms this pattern, saying: 
“Political exclusion plays the decisive role in civil war recurrence: political exclusion acts 
as a trigger for renewed hostilities.”34 Moreover, any side that feels deprived of their 
political rights in the post-conflict period will return to their previous practices to regain 
political inclusion.  
In a post-conflict situation, the institutions that embody the state must then be sure 
to represent the population equally in order to avoid the recurrence of war. There cannot 
be any segments of a population that feel they are being excluded; methods of political 
participation should be equitable for all citizens of a state. In this way, political inclusion 
is necessary to reduce the risk of returning to war, and it becomes a way in which ideas 
and opinions of the previously excluded segments are taken into account. Additionally, 
political inclusion can serve as a form of checks and balances, from one segment to 
another, and preventing the excesses of power and sharing the benefits equitably among 
all. Each population segment, no matter how small, must have representation in 
institutions of the government. Where political differences or divisions exist, debate 
should be the only option to resolve these differences between various segments of the 
population within a country.  
B. COERCION  
Those who have been threatened or coerced to fulfill the will of others will likely 
seek to defend themselves. Patrick Garrity, a research faculty affiliate with the Miller 
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Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, has written an article on this topic 
with Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, 
Israel; and Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy and 
Professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies 
at Missouri. In their article, “Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors,” they define 
coercion as, “Methods, including the use of force, to compel an adversary to change 
behavior—to cease or undo an action that has already been taken, or to cause those to 
take action they would not be inclined to take without the threat or use of force.”35 
However, coercion sometimes gets the opposite result. Those who decide to use coercion 
resort to the use of force or the use of violence to reduce the pressure over them, resulting 
in a war.  
Disarmament of the warring parties, usually just the insurgents, is one of the main 
objectives to be resolved during a peace agreement. The submission of weapons through 
the disarmament process may involve one or both parties in the conflict, depending on 
how the conflict has ended. In this respect, after they complete the turn-in of their 
weapons, the rebels are in a state of total vulnerability. Hirotaka Ohmura, Professor of 
International and Intrastate Conflict at Shiga University in Japan, explains this 
vulnerability: “Peace agreement requires a rebel group to disarm and demobilize, and 
such a requirement makes the rebel group more vulnerable to surprise military attacks 
and coercion than before.”36 Once the rebels have laid down their arms, the state must be 
committed to ensuring their safety, since in the past the weapons had guaranteed their 
survival. As soon as the rebels turn in their weapons, the government needs to provide 
protection to those who were formerly its attackers.  
The latter situation is a bit complicated and even more so when the wounds of war 
have not fully healed. In this context, if a government decides to violate the agreements 
and use its weapons to recover those benefits lost during the negotiations or extend the 
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gains of those negotiations by using coercion, the recurrence of war is imminent. 
Therefore, trust is a vital element for the combatants for reassurance of their security by 
turning in their weapons. The former combatants must be assured that their safety and 
survival will be guaranteed after a negotiated agreement.  
Coercion can also be used against the general population. Government entities or 
rebels who control a territory are a potential menace as they toy with the use of force or 
retaliation to achieve political ends. Elections present the opportunity for those who have 
weapons to put pressure on voters to achieve favorable political outcomes. These types of 
political results generate dissatisfaction, which usually leads to protest and often times 
can incite government repression. The use of coercion to achieve political victories 
makes the elected officials look legitimate, thereby threatening the durability of peace. 
Consequently, fears of repression that were a reason to start a war can reappear in the 
new phase after the conflict, when weapons were hidden.. 
C. ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION  
Ethnic differences can persist in the post-conflict stage, after a negotiated 
settlement, making any peace tentative. Ethnic discrimination has led to more deaths 
during civil wars than any other factor since the end of the Second World War. Wars in 
Kosovo, Rwanda, and Guatemala were marked by this factor. A salient feature of this 
factor is an “us vs. them” mentality. Warring parties may exploit the period of conflict, 
when there is a state of total dehumanization, to commit atrocities. Ethnic discrimination, 
though, is not just about the murder of one group by another or of a minority by majority. 
It can also mean denying the most basic services that a state must provide, such as 
security, health, and education, among others, to a certain group of the population, 
because they may be considered by the state as part of another class or of another social 
status.  
Ethnic discrimination is explained by Mason, in his book Sustaining the Peace 
after Civil War. According to Mason, it is “Those who are not members of the group 
favored by the state withhold their support from the state, either tacitly by neglecting to 
comply with state laws and regulations and evading taxes, or actively by organizing 
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opposition movements to challenge the incumbent regime.”37 Due to the marginalization 
suffered, targeted groups instigate protests and demonstrations in order to demand the 
recognition of their rights. It is usual that the initial reaction of government is to ignore 
the appeals of the marginalized, a situation that leads those protesting to make use of 
violence seeking greater government attention. With the presence of violence, the 
government is expected to use the same method—violence—to suppress the protestors. 
The latter situation makes the marginalized group increase the use of violence in order to 
obtain their rights, which have been denied, widening the gap between the government 
and the marginalized.  
The differences between ethnic groups may be even more difficult to solve than 
the other factor described in this chapter and it could be very possible that a combatant 
group prefers the total annihilation of the counterpart before having to sit down and talk 
with them. Mason and Jason Quinn, Research Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, in their 
article “Sustaining Peace: Stopping the Recurrence of Civil Wars,” state: “Ethnic civil 
wars are less likely to be brought to an end through a negotiation.”38 The ethnic 
differences complicate the ability of opposing ethnic groups to empathize with one 
another to come to a consensus. However, when a negotiated settlement is achieved, the 
post-conflict process is even more complicated and monumental efforts of reconciliation 
need to be made to achieve a sustainable peace. Call in his book, Why Peace Failed, 
suggests: “When there is a history of inequity between ethnic social groups, it 
complicates the process of democratization and peacebuilding after a conflict.”39 Thus, 
when ethnic discrimination occurs, such as in Rwanda, the chances of recurrence in war 
are high. Despite the agreements and possible achievement of peace, ethnic differences 
will persist in the post-war period, and those differences easily can initiate a conflict. 
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Ethnic discrimination has to be halted during the post-conflict period. It is 
difficult for peace to continue in an environment of persistent ethnic discrimination, and 
any act could be considered an act of racism or exclusion. The uncertainty of whether the 
government will comply with the terms of a negotiated settlement will always be present, 
and therefore, the use of weapons will be the most sought after option to make the 
government comply. 
D. ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES 
Scholars consider the economic dimensions as among the most important factors 
affecting the onset and recurrence of civil war. Economic factors are related mainly to the 
living conditions of the population, their personal incomes, the level of education and 
opportunities to which they have access, health care systems, and any possible benefits 
they are eligible to receive from the government, among others. When the resources of a 
nation are distributed among a few, a monopoly of wealth occurs, and a small number of 
elites realize the economic benefits. Thus, those among the population that do not receive 
enough economic benefits find reasons to challenge the government. Walter, in her article 
“Conflict Begets Conflict,” argues, “Misery or quality of life is a critical factor for onset 
and the recurrence in war.”40 Frequently, terrorist groups or rebels tap economic 
motivators to gain the public’s support for their causes, using the argument that they are 
fighting for those denied or nonexistent economic rights. In this regard, rebels and 
terrorist organizations find that better financial opportunities come through illicit 
activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, kidnapping and others. 
Frequently, illicit organizations use the money earned to recruit future fighters with the 
promise of higher wages. Indeed, those wages are higher than legally sanctioned 
activities could provide. 
Generally, during the peace agreements or negotiated settlements one of the main 
goals is to reduce the complaints that some communities have about their lack of access 
to the economic benefits of their nation. Thus, during the negotiated settlement and the 
post-conflict period, an equitable economic distribution is needed to avoid the previous 
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economic imbalance. Nevertheless, the economic problems faced by countries after a 
civil war are numerous, and those countries cannot expect to have enormous amounts of 
funds available overnight, even less so, the money available to distribute directly to the 
population. The results of war usually have worn down the domestic economy of a 
country and during such conflicts governments have invested their fiscal resources 
principally in fighting rebel groups dedicated to violent acts. The efforts that 
governments must make toward economic recovery are substantial and complicated. Paul 
Collier suggests the importance of this economic recovery: “Poor countries that are not 
developing but have so far escaped civil war are also racing against time. If they do not 
find ways to accelerate their economic growth and development, they will likely stumble 
into conflict.”41 Hence, when efforts to improve the economy have failed to reduce 
existing needs, the population’s disappointment persists, and those dissatisfied segments 
of the population push for the recurrence of war. Evidently, to reduce the possible 
recurrence of war the state must work to improve the quality of life of its citizens. This is 
a fundamental premise that includes healthcare, education, the right to work, public 
security, and among others.  
The post-conflict period is an excellent time for a government to reverse the 
negative effects of war. Anything that slows the growth and development of a nation can 
weaken democracy, increase inequality, injustice, and dissatisfaction in a society. For that 
reason, the economy must be strengthened to ensure the welfare of future generations. A 
better level of economic development would give more legitimacy to the government. 
Walter, in her article “Does Conflict Beget Conflict,” maintains, “Governments that are 
willing to address and settle key rebel grievances are believed to have a higher chance of 
avoiding renewed violence than governments that leave important issues unanswered.”42 
The demands, difficulties, beliefs, and opinions and, of course, the economic status of 
each individual are different, and consequently, the ability to meet their basic needs 
varies. When individuals cannot meet those needs, they may be inclined to participate in 
violent conflict to seek equality. 
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E. WEAK STATES  
“Weak states” refers to the inability of the government to exercise effective 
presence through its institutions over all geographic realms residing within the sovereign 
borders of a country. This absence of effective presence of the state means a failure in the 
provision of public security, health, education, development, justice, and other services to 
the population. A weak state is one in which the government has low credibility, as 
explained by Francisco Leal Buitrago, sociologist and honorary Professor of the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia and Universidad de Los Andes, who asserts, “State 
weakness is reflected in its poor ability to build confidence in their institutions, negotiate 
interests and institutionalize conflict resolution.”43 As a result, the lack of presence of 
government allows other organizations to fulfill the government tasks and acquire greater 
legitimacy than the government itself. Terrorists, rebels groups, and criminal 
organizations can take advantage of the absence of the state to establish their own rules in 
its place. Often, terrorists or rebels end up providing services that the state should 
provide, and reap the natural resources they can find in the area for their own benefit.  
Territorial control becomes the primary objective of both the government and the 
terrorist organization(s), when there is a weakness of state. Consequently, whoever has 
control of the territory acquires the advantage of exploiting the natural resources, as well 
as managing the income taxes collected from those regions. Thus, a war is triggered 
between the government and rebel groups to achieve territorial control and reap the 
benefits that territorial control bestows. Those who control the resources use them to 
finance the war by gaining income taxes and exploitation of natural resources. This 
demonstrates the states weakness, prolonging the conflict period forcing the warring 
parties to look for a negotiated solution to finish the conflict. 
In the post-conflict stage, after a negotiated settlement, the government is 
expected to occupy all the regions where its presence has been weak. Subsequently, the 
government is able to meet its obligations to its citizens. First, there is an expectation to 
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increase security in those regions, with inhabitants needing greater security against 
possible retaliatory attacks from armed groups that still exist or that could reorganize 
resistance. Those armed groups that appear after negotiations are dissident groups, who 
often find in the aftermath of war, the ideal business, profiting through illicit activities. 
Therefore, they are unlike many terrorist groups who demand during negotiations after 
the war’s end that the armed forces and the police should be strengthened to protect the 
territory left by the rebel factions and the public residing there. The presence by 
government forces will have to gain favor with and support from the population to 
establish the effective rule of law.  
The public security of a nation is a prerequisite not only for those demobilized, but 
also for the general population. Security not only allows greater cooperation between the 
citizens and the armed forces, it also ensures that other government entities feel free to 
work. As a result, the state can provide services properly, thus allowing the state to comply 
with its functions. A strong state not only must have strong armed forces, but also robust 
social and economic policies in order to reduce the emergence of social problems that can 
be manipulated to challenge lawful governance. Thus, if public security does not exist in a 
post-conflict environment and the government continues to be weak, new threats will 
appear to challenge the rule of law and governance and a recurrence of war would be the 
result. The latter is reaffirmed by Joseph Halon, a social scientist and Senior Lecturer in 
Development Policy and Practice at the Open University in United Kingdom, who says: 
“Weaker states often lack the resources to satisfy demands and maintain the peace; 
violence may seem the only way to force a government to meet group demands, leading to 
a civil war.”44 Therefore, the incapacity of the government to implement real presence over 
all its territory and exert control over that territory permits the recurrence of war. 
F. GREED  
Many conflicts are generated by the unequal distribution of the gross domestic 
product in a country from the resources of a nation. Countries with an economy that is 
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dependent mainly on a single commodity, for example, oil, gold, or diamonds, are prone 
to unpredictable global fluctuations in the international market, which limits the 
beneficiaries of the proceeds from those resources. Therefore, segments of the population 
find organized acts of violence the best way to ensure their needs in an insecure 
economic environment. The government’s failure to provide a secure economic 
environment can lead to grievances and even violence on the part of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population. By contrast, those who benefit the most economically, 
regardless of market fluctuations, could be considered the greedy. Greed is what makes 
those who benefit the most, prefer war as a means to continue enjoying the benefits of 
monopolizing the gross domestic product of a nation. William Reno, Professor at the 
Department of Political Science and Director of the Program of African Studies at 
Northwestern University, argues, “The economic interest of belligerents may be a 
powerful barrier to the termination of conflict. They may use war to control land and 
commerce, exploit labor, and ensure the continuity of assets and privileges to a group.”45 
Accordingly, giving up those economic privileges to obtain peace becomes one of the 
first obstacles to overcome in future negotiations. 
When a negotiated settlement during the post-conflict period provides less 
economic benefit than during the period of war, this situation is difficult to sustain. Hence, 
war seems like the only option for those who want to continue to have control over the 
fiscal benefits they receive from profit bearing activities, whether the money is made 
legally or illegally. The desire for money and power ends up overcoming any ideology that 
has led to support for a disadvantaged group seeking to recover its rights. The need for 
financial capital is necessary to carry out a war and meet even a small portion of the 
population’s needs. Yet sometimes, the demands of a few privileged groups makes waging 
war over the control of economic resources of a nation the preferred option for those who 
wish to maintain their privileges. Nevertheless, when war reaches a stalemate, those groups 
that have been fighting the government may have accumulated large amounts of money 
from illicit activities, and so they may decide to negotiate. 
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With negotiations terrorists, rebel organizations, and criminal groups try to avoid 
any loss of the economic privileges they have acquired through war. Negotiation 
becomes a way to legalize their illegal means of obtaining income and, if possible, obtain 
greater economic power. Hence, when their economic power is maintained during the 
post-conflict period, these groups can put pressure on certain deprived social groups to 
gain their support. If at any time, the economic benefits and the living conditions of those 
demobilized are not the same in the post-conflict period, the terrorists will use their best 
efforts to make things turn again in their favor, meaning war. Collier confirms this 
interest in war of certain groups who have better economic benefits in his article, “Doing 
Well out of War,” saying: “Although societies as a whole suffer economically from civil 
war, some small identifiable groups do well out of it. They thus have an interest in the 
initiation, perpetuation, and renewal of conflict.”46 Money and greed for power, instead 
of ideology, leads those who previously received large sums of money from illegal 
activities to continue with persistent interest even after a negotiated settlement. 
G. DESTRUCTION FROM THE PREVIOUS CIVIL WAR 
The wounds of war are not easy to heal and generate deep distrust among the 
parties’ that were previously in conflict. Usually, statistics of war show the number of 
violent deaths and devastation, mainly from the loss of infrastructure, caused by violent 
attacks used to break the will of the opponents. However, at the end of the war, the 
statistics of war do not show the total number of people injured or affected in some way 
by the war, such as those who suffered from psychological trauma. The statistics do show 
the number of victims, but they often do not measure qualitative factors, such as hatred 
and resentment. The resentment is generated not only in the civilian population, but also 
among those who fought. Those who took part in hostilities are usually trained to kill 
without remorse. The combatant conveys the idea that the enemy deserves death, thereby 
increasing levels of destruction. Walter proposes that, “Wars that inflict high costs on 
combatants and supporters could exacerbate animosity between them and create a strong 
desire for retribution even if the war ends. By this logic, high casualty rates make it less 
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likely that former enemies will ever successfully integrate into a single coherent 
society.”47 Therefore, the reconciliation process is much more complex in situations 
where war has lasted for long periods and caused much strife between combatants and 
civilians. This mistrust and insecurity make any act resemble a potential act of aggression 
and therefore a return to war becomes an option. 
On the other hand, long periods of war and destruction could make combatants 
and civilians more aware of the devastating effects, and thus convince them to continue 
toward peaceful efforts. Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, 
Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, claim that 
“long civil wars thus seem to convince groups of the futility of prevailing and thus the 
need to accommodate one another’s interest in a manner that mitigate security 
concerns.”48 As a result, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild assert, “If adversaries’ 
experiences over time have the effect of convincing them that they cannot prevail in 
battle, they may well calculate that returning to war has no payoff.”49 It is necessary to 
create confidence between the parties previously in conflict, so that the levels of 
insecurity do not persist. The reintegration process is important to generate peace links 
between sectors previously hurt by each other. Finally, if war wounds do not heal during 
the post-conflict period and hatred and the need for revenge continues, the recurrence of 
war is imminent.  
H. CONCLUSIONS  
After the warring parties decide to end the war through a negotiated settlement, it is 
difficult to determine how long a negotiation can last. Sometimes negotiations take months, 
in other situations, years. The length of the conflict, the causes of the conflict, and the 
damage caused during wartime influence negotiations. But, if negotiations are difficult, 
implementation is even more difficult. Walter argues with respect to implementation: “The 
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terms of a compromised agreement by all parties can be very difficult to achieve, but the 
implementation can be a critical barrier to successful cooperation. Whenever such an 
agreement is created, there is the potential for devastating opportunities for those that want 
to exploit the post-treaty environment.”50 As soon as agreements are reached, there is a 
period in which the parties are willing to cooperate and to continue their peace efforts. 
Therefore, parties must make an extra effort at this time to make the peace persist. Over 
time, former interests of the conflicting groups may reappear and cause a breach in the 
agreements, motivating the parties to return to war.  
To maximize the chances that peace will prevail after a negotiated settlement, the 
parties to that settlement need to have the will to perpetuate this period of peace. Peace 
does not depend on a third party, and it has been evident in the analysis of the previously 
discussed factors that peace depends on commitments between previous 
enemies. Therefore, war recurs through the parties lack of commitment to uphold the 
agreements made in the negotiations. All the factors mentioned in this chapter influence not 
only recurrence, but also are considered the main causes for the onset of a civil war. 
Clarifying that, a war can be initiated by a single factor or a mixture of several factors. It is 
necessary that during negotiations, adequate processes are established to help minimize the 
occurrence or reoccurrence of these factors in the period of post conflict. The economic and 
political recovery by countries devastated by war is not easy. Reintegration processes for 
ex-combatants may be more painful than the war itself, because rejection and social 
exclusion makes them feel better in war than outside of it. When this phase begins, Call 
argues, “It is an initial step moving toward peace and ensuring that it sticks is more 
important than ever.”51 Hence, the efforts to maintain peace will be greater than the efforts 
made to wage war. 
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III. ANGOLA 
During the period discussed in this chapter, from 1975 to the early 2000s, there 
were a series of proxy intrastate conflicts backed by global super powers, stemming from 
the Cold War. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) backed guerrilla 
insurgencies in multiple geographic realms, while the United States often supported the 
opposing forces in those insurgencies. The majority of such conflicts ended between the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. The purpose of this study is to find successful examples for 
transitioning to peace from Colombia might be able to learn. Are there qualitative 
methods that could be derived from analyzing Angola?  
In the following case study focusing on Angola, the authors review its historical 
experience with civil war and expound upon the factors for successful transition from 
civil war to sustainable peace. To work toward a persistent peace, the experience of 
Angola suggests that Colombia must consider the positive contributing factors of power 
sharing among the previous warring parties, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations 
with international support, and economic development. 
This chapter has four main sections. The first section presents the historical 
context of the civil war in Angola. The second offers an analysis of both ending 
hostilities and carrying out negotiations, along with the role of civil society in “making 
the peace.” The third section examines the chosen form of governance and whether 
elections were held, as well as the implementation of the peace accords—called “keeping 
the peace.” Finally, the fourth section offers a discussion of the factors that led to 
successful sustainable peace—called “sustaining peace”—and takeaways from the 
analysis of the Angolan experience. The following section is a historical introduction to 
Angola and its civil war. By understanding the history leading up to the civil war and the 
possible causes for Angola becoming embroiled in civil war serves to support a better 
understanding of the experience, and how warring parties’ resolved their issues as they 
moved towards peace. 
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A. THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR  
The Portuguese, who ruled Angola, were a leading colonial power on the African 
continent, imposing foreign rule as early as the late 15th century.52 With other European 
powers such as the British and French beginning to decolonize their territories in Africa 
from the 1950s to 1960s, Portuguese authorities resisted giving Angola independence. 
The aftermath of Angola’s large-scale riots, along with the unfolding of an internal 
division among the Portuguese elite, made the Angolan Civil War inevitable.53 The 
author of Angola: A Modern Military History stated:  
When insurgents launched their campaign to end more than four centuries 
of Portuguese rule, in early 1961, it appeared to be a striking, albeit 
unexpectedly violent example of the admirable “wind of change,” which 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan previously observed sweeping 
across Africa.54 
The geopolitical situation grew quickly into a state of turmoil with grievances 
from indigenous Angolans wanting greater political and economic inclusion. The major 
political rivalries turned into combatant groups and fought what seemed to be an 
unending civil war.  
The creation of different rebel groups was spurred by each one wanting its own 
interests to be realized and becoming “embroiled in a multi-sided struggle for power 
between right and left wing elements, as well as separatists in different provinces.”55 The 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) eventually emerged as the 
strongest and most powerful group to this day, holding the majority of political power. 
The MPLA was established in 1956, evolving out of the Angolan Communist Party. They 
gained domestic support from the indigenous people and intracontinental support from 
other African countries, the nation of Cuba, and the USSR. The other rebel groups 
included the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), supported domestically by the 
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Bakongo people; they sought the rebirth of the historical Kongo Empire, with external 
support coming from the governments of Zaire and China.56 The third group to wield 
power in Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
established in 1966, was led by Jonas Savimbi.57 When the MPLA took control of the 
capital, the group effectively solidified itself as the ruling party and declared 
independence from Portugal in November of 1975.58 After liberation from Portugal was 
secured, there was a series of civil wars fought corresponding to a series of ceasefires and 
accords, which led to an enduring peace accord signing in 2002. 
The first Angolan Civil War began after gaining independence from Portugal, 
from 1975 to 1992. In the latter part of this civil war, foreign support dwindled for the 
MPLA, due to communism losing favor among external financial backers. As a result, a 
negotiated settlement became a widely accepted move to end to the conflict and preserve 
gains in power. There were negotiations for a new constitution and support for a multi-
party system, which became popular among all parties, as an inclusive measure towards 
power sharing. When internationally recognized free and balanced elections took place in 
Angola, the MPLA received a majority of votes, which caused the UNITA to accuse 
them of electoral fraud and prompted a recurrence of civil war.59 
The second Angolan Civil War raged on after renewed hostilities that lasted from 
1992 to 2002.60 A turn of events that occurred as the internal fighting continued was 
when UNITA gained support from international powers such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, along with the regional power, South Africa. The new support put a 
great deal of pressure on UNITA to reach a peaceful solution. As a result, the Lusaka 
Accord was signed in 1994, by which both parties attempted to reach a peaceful solution 
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by requiring greater inclusionary policies between the MPLA and UNITA. Unfortunately, 
after the two groups failed to develop inclusionary policies, tensions led to the expulsion 
of UNITA delegates from the government. After UNITA refused to accept the results of 
the election in 199261 and affirm the peace deal in 1994,62 the group was thrown out of 
the national government, and the aggregate effect led to alienation from international 
benefactors.  
The key development that changed the course of events toward eventual peace 
occurred when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed. In the Daily Telegraph, his 
obituary reads: “JONAS SAVIMBI, the Angolan rebel leader … has been shot dead, 
aged 67, received the backing of the West in his battle against Angola’s Marxist regime 
during the Cold War, but later became an international outcast as he refused to stop 
waging war on his country’s government.”63 After the death of UNITA’s charismatic 
leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, a peace agreement between UNITA and the 
Angolan government was brokered and signed in April 2002, successfully ending the 
protracted Angolan civil war.64 The peace agreement called for all combatants from 
UNITA to demobilize and become integrated into the Angolan army and police forces, 
while at the same time create a political party.65  
B. FROM ENDING A CIVIL WAR TO SUSTAINING THE PEACE  
The transition from war to sustaining the peace takes on a complex nature that 
does not have a simple template solution for all nations working for persistent peace. 
However, as a framework for the following sections, there are some generally accepted 
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phases that experts agree make up the process. The first phase after a civil war has ended 
is called making peace; the second phase is called keeping the peace; and the last is 
sustaining the peace.66  
1. Phase I: Making Peace  
This section provides greater understanding of Angola’s peace process and the 
role of civil society. In Angola, there are clear examples of negotiated peace settlements; 
however, Angola’s experience was somewhat of a hybrid process, since there was a 
pending accord from 1994, though it was not officially enacted until UNITA’s leader 
died in 2002. Angola was able to end the fighting and adopt a formal agreement to move 
toward peace. The following discussion centers on the process Angola took and addresses 
how Angola chose to achieve a settlement. 
2. Angola’s Transition to Making the Peace 
Angola experienced three attempts at making peace and was not successful until 
the death of Jonas Savimbi, when the country completed the agreement from 1994. The 
formalized final agreement ending hostilities was the Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding. The majority of civil society was in support of the MPLA holding power 
and expressed this through elections held in 1992. The United Nations (UN) had a 
supporting role in its mandate called the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola 
(MONUA).  
The first accord, called the Bicesse Peace Accord, was signed on May 31, 1991.67 
It declared a cease fire and assigned “the responsibility of the Government of Angola and 
UNITA to act under the Joint Political and Military Commission (CCPM).”68 The accord 
began the process toward democratization, leading to the first elections with multiple 
parties, including the presidential elections in September of 1992. The results of these 
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elections were confirmed by international observers as being free and fair, and the MPLA 
was lawfully placed in the position as the ruling party. The results, however, were 
disputed by UNITA leadership, and the country relapsed into civil war. The failed 
attempt with the first accord led to a more brutal and much bloodier period for Angola.  
The second accord was called the Lusaka Protocol and was signed on November 
20, 1994, by Angola’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Venancio de Moura, and the 
ex-UNITA secretary general, Eugenio Ngolo Manuvakola.69 The protocol made 
provisions for the creation of a government with Greater Unity and Reconciliation to 
ensure continued momentum toward durable peace. The accord lasted for only about four 
years and called for the demobilization of the Angolan Government forces and UNITA’s 
armed element.  
Unfortunately, Angola reverted to a bloody internal conflict in 1998. The 
government forces pushed into rural areas in the eastern provinces to maneuver the 
population into urban centers. The displacement of innocent civilians by the government 
led to a flooding of urban centers and a humanitarian catastrophe.70 Although the civil 
society was negatively affected, the military campaign had a positive effect for the 
government by pushing UNITA fighters to surrender, thus weakening the rebel group. 
The final event leading to the demise of UNITA came from the death of Jonas Savimbi. 
His death opened the door to completing the previously brokered peace accord.  
The formalized armistice was signed as a memorandum of understanding by both 
parties on April 4, 2002. “The memorandum, which will be annexed to the Lusaka 
Protocol, was signed by General Geraldo Sachipengo ‘Nunda,’ deputy chief of staff of 
the Angolan Armed Forces, and General Abreu Muengo ‘Kamorteiro,’ chief of the 
Supreme General Staff of the UNITA Military Forces.”71 
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One of the first provisions to be implemented under the Luena Memorandum was 
Angola’s DDR program for UNITA combatants, as they began integrating into the 
Angolan Armed Forces and police forces. Often the first step in a DDR program, the 
memorandum defined assembly points for UNITA combatants and how they would be 
disarmed. The memorandum additionally called for UNITA’s transformation into a 
purely political party and the reinstatement of government administration throughout the 
country.72 
The UN’s presence had minimal effect on the situation for implementation. Since 
UNITA forces did not want to comply with the 1994 protocol; the UN’s effort lost 
momentum and became irrelevant in the process. UNITA’s preference to continue with 
military operations instead of complying with the 1994 accord delayed the formal 
beginning to keep and sustain the peace. When the war re-ignited, the UN Security 
Council withdrew all troops. The Angolan Government wrongfully blamed the UN for 
not disarming UNITA forces. After the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA agreed to unite 
into one party in order to begin national reconciliation.73 
The transition for Angola to make peace by establishing their respective accords 
ended the hostilities that fueled their civil wars, but this is the most basic of steps taken 
toward establishing sustained peace. The necessity for sovereign nations and insurgent 
guerrilla groups to uphold peace accords is fundamental to move to the next phase.74 
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3. Phase II: Angola Keeping the Peace 
This section provides greater understanding of Angola’s post-conflict governance, 
elections, and issues related to implementation of the peace accords. The transition from 
making peace to keeping it involves disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration of 
combatant troops, SSR setting up transitional security apparatuses, and free and fair 
elections, along with implementation of negotiated settlement objectives. This section 
addresses how Angola chose to keep the peace, and begins to answer questions for 
sustaining it.  
a. Angola’s Transition to Keeping the Peace  
The University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies has 
placed Angola at an overall completion rate for implementing their peace accords, since 
inception, at 88 percent.75 The Luena Memorandum, signed in 2002, initiated the end to 
hostilities in Angola. “The memorandum, which will be annexed to the Lusaka Protocol, 
was signed by General Geraldo Sachipengo ‘Nunda,’ deputy chief of staff of the Angolan 
Armed Forces, and General Abreu Muengo ‘Kamorteiro,’ chief of the Supreme General 
Staff of the UNITA Military Forces.”76 The symbolic commitment made by the senior 
officers of each side gave proof early on that the declaration for a ceasefire had the 
support at the highest levels between these two organizations, “aimed at ending the armed 
conflict in order to achieve peace and national reconciliation.”77  
After the signing of the Luena Memorandum, troops from UNITA began the 
demobilization process by traveling to designated assembly points. A senior member of 
the UNITA, General Samuel Chiwale, “instructed his troops to report to the assembly 
points in the Luena agreement immediately.”78 In April 2003, Ibrahim A. Gambari, 
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United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, commented on 
Angola’s progress by stating that:  
From the moment that ceasefire was declared in March 2002 until today, 
no single shot has been fired, and no skirmishes have been reported in 
violations of the cease-fire. The process of disarmament of UNITA was 
completed and members of UNITA forces were integrated into the 
national army and police.79 
On April 4 of each year since the signing of the Luena Memorandum, Angola has 
been able to commemorate with celebration as a day of peace and reconciliation between 
the MPLA and the UNITA. The following benchmarks helped to solidify the ceasefire 
and move towards the next phase.  
C. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION 
The DDR program in Angola by all accounts is widely considered a case study for 
success. The numbers are astounding, with nearly all combatants—estimated at over 
80,000—complying, from the most senior leaders to the foot soldiers and with an 
estimated 400,000 family members. The strategy taken by President Dos Santos’ 
government worked in his favor by prioritizing those members of UNITA that could be 
the greatest threat to peace and had the ability to consolidate forces to have the forces to 
revert to conflict. Dr. Imogen Parsons from the London School of Economics describes 
the strategy by stating, “senior generals and officers could be ‘bought off’, and the rank 
and file definitively separated from their leaders—an effective strategy on the part of the 
government.”80 The package received per combatant was nearly, “5 months back 
payments of salaries according to military rank, a US$100 reintegration allowance and a 
‘kit’ of basic household items and tools, as well as full identity and demobilization 
documentation.” The family members of combatants received a small amount of aid in 
comparison.  
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The process for disarming combatants is shown to have transferred almost 90 
percent of the remaining weapons, with the other 10 percent still in the hands of the 
civilian population. Although the remaining arms in possession of civilians did not 
materialize into another armed conflict, the country continues to be heavily armed. 
According to Imogen Parsons, in her article “Beyond the Silencing of Guns 
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration,” “the Angolan Police cit[e] a figure of 
3–4 million small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians.”81 There have been 
initiatives to disarm the civilian population, but nothing has been executed. Within 
Angolan civil society, it is often considered a necessity to own a weapon for personal 
security and to demonstrate political affiliation.  
The process for reintegration has not received the necessary attention or resources 
and has continued to be a challenge for many prior combatants. There were stalled 
attempts to help support reintegration efforts, but setbacks were the inadequate support to 
track funds and administer programs outside the capital of Luanda. This highlights a 
fundamental issue with establishing strategic support outside the center of government 
where ex-combatants will settle:  
Institutions and bodies established to handle resettlement, return, and 
reintegration have a weak presence in the provinces, and there is little 
effective coordination between the activities of the various national and 
international NGOs. Reintegration is also taking place in the context of the 
return of around 3–4 million IDPs [internally displaced persons] and 
almost half a million refugees, often to areas with weak state 
administrative capacity, and serious constraints on access to areas of 
resettlement.82 
After a civil war, the internal animosity and emotional toll within a nation that 
was previously divided is understandable. However, to reach sustainable peace, ex-
combatants “should not be seen to benefit unduly from their participation in the war. 
Rather reintegration presupposes their integration into a community and the development 
of that community as a whole, not as individuals or ‘target groups.’”83 The balancing act 
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of reintegrating ex-combatants and their families is difficult, but with a strategic 
approach, international support, and adequate people and resources placed where ex-
combatants plan to settle it can be achieved.  
D. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
SSR is not palliative or short term. It is a core element of multi-
dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, essential for addressing the 
roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term peace and 
development. 
—Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations.84 
The importance of emphasizing SSR is an absolute necessity for any nation to 
make the transition from civil war to sustained peace. It is widely accepted that security 
sector institutions include the military, police forces, border security, customs officials, 
and correctional facilities. The security sector can more broadly include the judicial 
sector, which will oversee the prosecution of human rights and misuse of force. For 
purposes of this study, the two main institutions to implement reforms after conflict 
include the military and police forces.  
The delegations from UNITA and MPLA negotiated responsibility for integration 
of UNITA forces in the Lusaka Protocol. The two parties’ agreed upon integrating 
members of all ranks from UNITA into the Angolan Armed Forces and National Police. 
The responsibility for integrating UNITA’s junior military officers and enlisted personnel 
was given to UNITA’s high general staff, while mid-grade officers to general officers fell 
on the Angolan Armed Forces to integrate. Finally, the responsibility for incorporation 
and designation of senior police ranks such as commissioner and superintendents fell on 
the highest-level command of the National Police.  
In 2002, Angola’s Joint Military Commission spokesperson, “General Francisco 
Furtado had announced that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan 
Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July…. In July, a total 
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of 30 UNITA Generals joined the FAA as part of a military integration process.”85 
Additionally, 224 UNITA troops were sworn into the national army.86 These numbers 
increased substantially in 2003, with over 5,007 UNITA troops, “four generals, eight 
lieutenant-generals, 18 brigadiers, 40 colonels, 60 lieutenant-colonels, 100 majors, 150 
captains, 200 lieutenants, 250 sub-lieutenants, and 40 UNITA generals were incorporated 
into positions within the National Police.”87 This effectively completed the 
implementation of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding and Lusaka Protocol for 
military and police integration. 
E. GOVERNANCE REFORM 
Angola’s reconciliation efforts for greater inclusion in governance were initiated 
with the signing of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol and reaffirmed with the signing of the 
Luena Memorandum. The changes once agreed upon led to greater integration of and 
participation from UNITA, with respect to civil administration, electoral and political 
parties, and the overall transitional government’s ability to share power.  
The theme of inclusivity to power sharing is important for countering efforts to 
revert to hostilities. The concessions made during the peace agreement led to change 
within the government and to security reform. The following are reforms highlighting the 
path Angola undertook in order to keep the peace and begin to share power.  
Angola’s commitment among warring parties’ for reconciliation set the stage for 
members from UNITA to participate in all levels of the government and in institutions 
with influence over the political, administrative, and economic activities of the country. 
The political concessions enforced were agreed upon during the Lusaka Protocol and 
reaffirmed with the Luena Memorandum. They were made legal by the Angolan National 
Assembly allowing the “first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates ... be 
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installed in their functions in the National Assembly… [and] shall constitute the UNITA 
parliamentary group ... all the deputies in the National Assembly shall enjoy the rights, 
freedoms, guarantees, immunities, and privileges provided by the law.”88 At present, 
there are five political parties, including the warring factions of UNITA and MPLA, with 
32 members holding office from the UNITA party out of 220 national assembly 
members.89 The MPLA continues to dominate the national assembly, but it has 
effectively integrated some representation from UNITA.  
The Lusaka Protocol initiated power sharing within the civil administration in 
1997, which mandated 11 senior level positions among the cabinet level ministries in the 
Angolan Government.90 The MPLA has been slow to make this mandate a reality, but 
started in 1997 when President Dos Santos appointed his cabinet of 28 ministers into the 
Government of National Unity and Reconciliation.91 According to the decree signed by 
the president, four of the 28 cabinet ministers were from the former rebel movement of 
UNITA. They were the Minister of Geology and Mines, Marcos Samondo; the Health 
Minister, Anastacio Ruben Sikato; the Minister of Trade, Victorino Hossi; and the 
Minister of Hotels and Tourism, Jorge Valentim. The other 24 ministers were from 
President Dos Santos’ MPLA party.92 
The lack of genuine power sharing from President Dos Santos did not go 
unnoticed, and in 2004, the leader of UNITA spoke out expressing his concern for not 
enough shared political appointments. The overall integration within the federal 
government included four cabinet level ministers, seven deputy ministers, and six 
ambassadors. MPLA’s leader began reversing their move towards greater integration by 
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the end of 2004, leaving only one appointed UNITA cabinet member, the Minister of 
Geology and Mines, Manuel Africano.93 Although, UNITA did not share equitably 
among senior cabinet ministerial positions, their share of provincial, and local 
administration postings had a much better outcome.  
The Lusaka Protocol called for extensive numbers of provincial and local level 
positions to be given to UNITA, following the 1994 protocol and reaffirmed with the 
Luena Memorandum. “In all, 150 administrative positions are mentioned in the Lusaka 
text, [with] 4 governor positions and 7 deputy governor positions,” and at the municipal 
level there were 30 administrators, 35 deputy administrators 75 administrators of 
communes.94 Additionally, considerable progress towards making local and municipal 
positions available to UNITA after the 1994 protocol demonstrated a credible 
commitment from President Dos Santos to fulfill the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.  
The progress made towards inclusionary reforms within the Angolan Government 
at the federal, provincial, and local levels was last publicly acknowledged in 2004, by 
UNITA leadership, when their “Secretary for Information, Adalberto da Costa Junior ... 
mentioned the swearing in of UNITA administrators and remaining local level 
appointments.”95 The statement suggests a majority of positions offered to UNITA were 
filled.  
The electoral process, a demonstration of democratic will and political 
participation by a nation’s citizens, demonstrates respect for expression of choice for its 
leadership. After Jonas Savimbi’s rejection of the results of the elections in 1994 and 
reengagement in hostilities by UNITA, the electoral process’ fate was not promising. 
However, in 1998 the Angolan government led by President Dos Santos declared “that 
UNITA was a fully legalized political party, although multi-party elections would not be 
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held for several years.”96 Later in 2008, Angola held its first elections in over 16 years, 
with a majority of positions won by President Dos Santos’ ruling party.97 
F. ANGOLAN FACTORS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
The successful factors of application for sustainable peace are defined Chapter I, 
including power sharing among the previous warring parties, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operations with international support, and lasting economic development. 
Each of these factors draws on theories by current academics and application from our 
case study analysis. While the authors consider the factors to be keys to a successful 
transition to sustainable peace, not all nations have needed to experience them for a 
successful outcome.  
The Angolan case study has demonstrated an application of the positive factors 
for sustained peace. Many issues remain, but present day Angola has a greater level of 
power sharing and has received international support to develop its economic 
infrastructure, giving greater stake to both sides in the future of the nation. The positive 
factors for sustainable peace are demonstrated in Angola, except for peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding in the conventional use of international support from the United Nations.  
1. Power Sharing
Angola has made great strides in the area of power sharing since the 
implementation of the Luena Memorandum. There is much that could still be done to 
demonstrate true power sharing at the national level, but as earlier analysis would 
indicate, the local levels have received greater representation by both parties. According 
to the Notre Dame Peace Accords’ matrix, efforts for power sharing are nearly two-thirds 
complete, with the greatest outstanding issue being nearly zero representation in the 
96 “Electoral/Political Party Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre 




president’s cabinet by the opposition. There has been no new momentum to appoint 
members of the opposition to his cabinet since 2008.98  
According to Call, a major factor in resolving the issues that a rebel organization 
may have in peace negotiations is to establish an agreement of power sharing as a system 
of governance among which the rebel parties involved in the conflict are granted a role.99 
The framework for power sharing was established with the signing of the Luena 
Memorandum and annexed to the Lusaka Protocol. The following statement by Hartzell 
rings true for the experience in Angola that, “[a]greements that preserve adversaries’ 
organizations and call for them to share power will stabilize the peace by providing rivals 
with a stake in the state and by making it difficult for opponents to use force to alter war-
ending bargains.”100  
In the case of Angola, the agreement made helped to keep the rebel group 
politically intact; however, the DDR process dismantled its organizational structure, thus 
neutralizing the armed faction of the organization. The leadership was given the 
opportunity to lead through Angola’s political process and to share in the power structure 
of the state. A great majority of UNITA’s senior leadership and lower ranking members 
were integrated into the military and police forces. Through integration a form of power 
sharing was given to all members of the former rebel group, as well as a stake in the 
future of the state and their own economic well-being from steady employment. 
2. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations 
The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola had a very limited effect. When 
Jonas Savimbi was not content with the outcome of the elections in the post Lusaka 
Protocol period, the United Nations mission became inconsequential. The leadership of 
UNITA decided that reverting to hostilities was the only way to move towards peace. 
Then President Dos Santos alleged that MONUA was not fulfilling its mandate to disarm 
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the rebel group and force transition. When both parties chose to revert to hostilities, the 
UN Security Council withdrew its peacekeeping forces. After the UN was unable to 
support keeping the peace, other approaches were implemented, such as sanctions. The 
peace process did not resume until after the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, prompting 
the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The leadership of UNITA 
agreed to end the civil war and begin to keep the peace.  
The Luena Memorandum, after the death of Savimbi, was signed indicating the 
rebel groups’ commitment to peace. Although the literature has made it clear that 
intervention by the international community helps to sustain the peace, the Angolan 
experience demonstrates that international support is helpful; however, not having 
peacekeeping forces did not prohibit Angola from ending the civil war and sustaining the 
peace. The efforts of international actors to support conflict-ridden states from avoiding a 
recurrence to armed conflict are well worth the purpose for using them,101 but are not 
required.  
3. Economic Development 
The economic environment in a post conflict nation requires reforms to be 
enacted to stimulate economic growth and interjection of timely international aid to avoid 
the relapse in hostilities. There is no clear-cut solution to fix the ills of post-conflict 
economies in a short period; however, good economic policies have the opportunity to 
diminish the risk of renewed hostilities. According to Collier, “Economic strategy can 
only complement other strategies for keeping the post-conflict peace.” Collier advocates 
for a dual strategy relying on economic and political reforms and suggests technical 
expertise tends to focus more on political rather than economic strategies due to the type 
of individuals commonly writing the policies.  
The Angolan economy has grown since the end of the conflict to become one of 
the strongest in the region and it has thrived simply through the ending of the civil war, 
which had a substantial positive impact. For countries that end their civil wars, the 
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potential growth rate can be very high. “Angola experienced double digit growth in GDP 
[gross domestic product] annually in the period 2002–2008. In the last five of these years, 
average annual growth was at 17 [percent], which more than doubled the size of the 
economy.”102 
During the decade following a conflict, external forces should maintain the peace, 
while pursuing economic recovery policies. Collier further argues that “the most common 
policy error of post-conflict governments is to maintain military spending around conflict 
levels.” A reduction in military spending can reduce the risk of further conflict and the 
resources utilized to benefit those economic policies. The priority for policy reforms in 
most post-conflict nations includes reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, integration 
from the rural economy into the national markets, and enforcement of property rights. 
The post-conflict period is a time to build strong public/private partnerships, which can 
be developed to enforce contract law, strengthen accountability among public entities, 
and support creation of a sound ethical business environment. If strong accountability and 
ethical practices are cultivated early on, then a patronage system will have less ability to 
develop.  
In the case of Angola, its oil rich resources have provided a steady flow of 
funding to the government however creating challenges for diversifying the economy.  
The booming oil industry creates wealth in related sectors—finance, 
hospitality, and other industries that service oil companies—but it also 
makes it costlier for everyone to do business. Aftereffects of the civil war 
have exacerbated these asymmetries. Economists say the Angolan 
government has done an admirable job at stabilizing the economy—
reducing inflation (which was in the triple digits during the war) and 
paying back creditors.103  
Angola has chosen to focus on large-scale infrastructure projects instead of 
educating its workforce. The shortfall in technical skills has diminished the government’s 
ability to sustain large-scale work projects. “Government ministries were returning up to 
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40 percent of their budgets to the Treasury...because projects couldn’t be 
implemented,”104 stated by Hare, Executive Director of the U.S.-Angola Chamber of 
Commerce. Angola’s experience in a post-conflict scenario has been successful, but 
relied too heavily on its oil and not on diversifying the economy. A vast majority of the 
population lives in abject poverty and has not experienced the economic gains that those 
at the top have enjoyed.  
G. CONCLUSION 
For nearly 30 years, the Angolan Civil War persisted despite multiple attempts at 
ending the conflict. After Jonas Savimbi’s death, the MPLA had a clear way forward with 
the Luena Memorandum to end the civil war and implement peace. Angola achieved a 
sustainable peace through the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, agreed upon by the 
warring parties. Through the fulfillment of the peace accord, many of the issues rooted in 
the origin of the civil war were addressed. The following is an agenda that achieved 
peace and could serve as an example to future nations ending their own civil wars:  
 Ensure political inclusion within the government and particularly the 
military. 
 During the DDR process, have specific assembly points, ensure the 
collection of all arms, and ensure that reintegration is not limited to ex-
combatants, but includes families. Allocate resources for reintegration 
where ex-combatants and family members will settle. For Angola, the 
integration of combatants into the military served a dual purpose—
economic stability and integration. 
 Acknowledge that political sharing is important; however, governance has 
to be accepted by civil society and, if not, then proper representation must 
be given to ensure inclusion. 
 Reduce reliance on international support and increase reliance on domestic 
efforts to move the country toward enduring peace; if internal issues 
persist, they can ultimately lead to renewed armed conflict. 
 Transform the warring factions into unarmed political groups to give them 
a stake in the future of a unified country. 
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 Focus on economic development, particularly on large works projects with 
a trained and ready workforce to jumpstart the economy, while integrating 
the rural economy into the national markets, and enforce property rights. 
The authors hope that the case study presented has given a thorough analysis of 
Angola’s transition from civil war to sustained peace. The specific factors outlined in the 
case study illustrate the positive enduring effects that a nation can achieve if it follows a 
similar process. Such nations can transition from civil war to lasting peace through the 
process of negotiated settlement and proper implementation. Our initial thoughts that a 
persistent peace can be achieved through positive factors of power sharing, peace 
building, and economic development is demonstrated through the experiences in Angola 
and, hopefully, soon in Colombia. 
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IV. MOZAMBIQUE  
In the following case study, focusing on Mozambique, the authors review its war 
for independence from Portugal and post-independence civil war, and analyze the 
contributing factors that have pushed the nation back into renewed conflict. Although it 
has experienced a return of civil war, Mozambique’s initial attempt at peace that lasted 
almost two decades of peace offers valuable lessons. The negative factors that led to civil 
war recurrence are analyzed for this purpose. The following factors include: political 
exclusion, coercion, ethnic discrimination, economic grievances, weak states, greed, and 
destruction from the previous civil war. The Mozambique civil war ended with a 
negotiated settlement and near complete implementation of its peace accord; however, 
unresolved issues have stifled Mozambique’s prospects for a durable peace. This is due in 
part to problems that originated from the onset of its post-independence from Portugal 
and divisions that persist to the present. The authors draw from historical experiences in 
Mozambique to suggest ways Colombia could move forward to end its own civil war and 
build sustainable peace. 
This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section presents a historical 
overview of Mozambique. The second offers an analysis of the peace accords 
implemented as well as the United Nations’ role for peacebuilding. The third section 
focuses on government reforms and how elections may have caused the renewed conflict; 
and the fourth section offers a discussion of the negative factors that provide insight into 
the recurrence of hostilities. The following section presents a historical introduction to 
the country and Mozambique’s experience with civil war. Why did renewed hostilities re-
occur in Mozambique, and what negative factors could have received greater attention to 
prevent the recurrence?  
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ITS CIVIL WAR  
The Portuguese began colonization of Mozambique in the 16th century,105 as they 
did in Angola. However, in stark contrast, the geographic territory of modern 
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Mozambique is composed of previously existing, strongly unified indigenous kingdoms. 
The Kingdom of Monomotapa territorial control included, “the entire Zambezi River 
Valley (modern day Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) from Zumbo in what is now North 
Central Mozambique to the Indian Ocean.”106 This made it more difficult for Europeans 
to penetrate the interior and thus colonization did not quickly take hold past the coastline. 
The kingdoms were rich from overseas trade and having a network throughout the Indian 
Ocean and parts of the Middle East.107 Although the Portuguese arrived in the late 15th 
century, for the next 400 years the settlers stayed near the coastal regions, trading with 
the African kingdoms. The Portuguese intended to displace indigenous groups from their 
monopolistic hold on trade in gold, ivory, and seaport rights. 
In the early 17th century, after a generation of war, the kingdom of Monomotapa 
surrendered its gold to the King of Portugal.108 This in turn caused land disbursement 
among Portuguese settlers to ensure control and the initial establishment of a permanent 
settlement in a semi-feudal organization of estates, termed “prazos,” along the Zambezi 
River Valley.109 The Portuguese viceroy from Goa, a small colony in India administered 
colonial Mozambique.110 The Portuguese began to lose legitimacy due to the gradual loss 
of control over the economy with inhabitants from India taking control of the ivory trade, 
and North Americans the slave trade. Since the native Portuguese settlement did not 
establish strong governance or control over the economy, authority and legitimacy 
migrated back to the African kingdoms.  
The winds of change came to bear after the 1885 Berlin Conference, which placed 
European powers against one another over laying territorial claims to the colonization of 
Africa. The colonization rights of Portugal over Mozambique were questioned, because 
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their control over the colony had slowly dissipated.111 The conference gave Portugal the 
right to settle lands that were inland; however, due to the lack of adequate resources for 
expansion they turned to the British, which gladly helped to deter Germans from settling 
near their colony of Rhodesia. The British supported the Portuguese colony, which 
continued into the 20th century. The Portuguese reciprocated by sending Mozambican 
unskilled laborers to work in British mines.  
In 1932, under the fascist leadership of Portuguese Prime Minister António de 
Oliveira Salazar, the Portuguese government sought the assertion of control over the 
colony.112 During this period, companies based in Portugal were encouraged to have 
trade agreements with Portuguese colonies, which prompted thousands of workers to 
immigrate to Mozambique. Next, although domestically the Portuguese avoided land 
reforms they decided instead to move landless peasants to Mozambique. While 
Portuguese settlers continued to work with indigenous leaders in the interior of 
Mozambique, settlers on the coastline dominated political and social life, resulting in 
continued divisions among the population.  
The struggle for independence from Portugal was initiated in 1962 by the 
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which was established to fight for 
independence from Portuguese rule.113 When the Portuguese were not willing to allow 
the indigenous population to negotiate their liberty, it prompted FRELIMO to push for 
reforms through military revolution. The Portuguese emplaced countermeasures against 
such a revolt. They did this by increasing public security and sending more troops; 
however, these efforts proved ineffective, as the FRELIMO was victorious.114  
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In the wake of independence, war with the Portuguese ended on June 25, 1975, 
and Mozambique gained its freedom from Portugal.115 FRELIMO defeated the colonial 
army and a majority of the nation was in support of the group. “Since its formation in 
1962 in Dar es Salaam, FRELIMO sought, as part of its central mission, to build a deep 
sense of national unity among the ethnically and linguistically diverse population.”116 
The divisions that existed internally had different leaders, geographically diverse 
constituencies, and separate expectations of the role for a unified nation.  
The FRELIMO policies in the post-independence era made a larger portion of the 
population discontent with them as the self-designated political power and placed 
factions against one another. Such policies included making “political opposition illegal, 
guaranteeing themselves full political power and the opportunity to set the future 
direction of the entire country. This tight political control was essential for FRELIMO to 
implement its socialist transformation, including nationalization of services, new systems 
of governance, and centralized production and control over resources.”117 
Another damaging policy was the persecution of groups that had any association 
with the former Portuguese colonial government. The FRELIMO government sent 
citizens considered to have benefited from their association to camps. They would be re-
indoctrinated, or worse imprisoned, if found suspect of not being loyal to the 
revolutionary cause. Accordingly, “[s]ingled out for particular disdain were former 
Mozambican members of the police force, the army, and the intelligence units.”118 Any 
group that operated against the FRELIMO struggle was at risk.  
After Mozambique had received independence from Portugal, there were a few 
reasons for the outbreak of civil war. The burgeoning nation may have fought 
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victoriously for its freedom against Portugal, but the divisions that existed internally in 
Mozambique were not settled from the onset of independence. The regional factions 
existed from centuries earlier and not all agreed with FRELIMO being their governing 
body; thus, roots of discontent existed from colonial times through the time of 
independence. Next, policies enacted by the FRELIMO were not accepted by all 
segments of the population. Last, the government was not capable to govern from the 
very beginning; it lacked adequate funds and was not able to ensure public security or 
enforce the policies it established. Therefore, Mozambique was moving towards civil war 
due to the volatile security situation in the post-independence period and the status lost by 
Portuguese settlers under FRELIMO’s political control. The political instability that was 
present in Mozambique led to the establishment of a guerrilla force through armed 
revolution.  
In 1976, the opposition force to FRELIMO was established; the Mozambican 
National Resistance (RENAMO), led by Dhalakama, mostly drew from white officers 
from Rhodesia who wanted to keep guerrilla forces from trying to overthrow the 
Rhodesian government. The pool of recruits included former police and armed forces 
members along with dissidents from FRELIMO, who were sent to camps to be re-
doctrinated into FRELIMO’s ideology after the struggle for independence with Portugal.  
The RENAMO received strong support from the South African military, receiving 
training and the use of bases in the south, bordering both nations. The RENAMO was 
against the FRELIMO-led, self-proclaimed Marxist government and used guerrilla tactics 
such as disrupting the economy by cutting power lines, destroying the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure, and securing the energy deposits. The RENAMO were 
ruthless with respect to massacring whole towns and villages, proving their guerrilla 
forces were very successful at terrorizing the population. In the late 1980s, conservative 
estimates showed that nearly 100,000 died while nearly one million were displaced from 
their homes or fled the country to become refugees in neighboring countries. 
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Mozambique’s civil war continued to rage until a peace accord was signed between the 
RENAMO rebels and the Mozambique government on October 4, 1992.119 
B. FROM IMPLEMENTING PEACE ACCORDS TO RENEWED CIVIL 
WAR 
At the time the peace accords were signed, effectively ending the civil war, 
Mozambique had achieved remarkable progress with its implementation of the negotiated 
settlement. The nation successfully transitioned from war to an enduring peace that lasted 
for about 20 years. “The sustained political stability; transformed its political and 
economic system from one-party state to a constitutional democracy; and moved from a 
socialist centrally-planned economy to a market-based system.”120 The following 
sections of this chapter outline how Mozambique successfully implemented its peace 
accords and analyze the negative factors of an unstable peace that have motivated a 
renewal of hostilities from RENAMO toward the FRELIMO majority government. The 
following section provides greater understanding of Mozambique’s achievement of peace 
from a negotiated settlement. In Mozambique, there is a clear example of a negotiated 
peace settlement. The nation was able to end the fighting and adopt a formal agreement to 
move towards peace.  
1. Mozambique’s Transition to Keeping the Peace 
The path Mozambique took to keep the peace follows a similar one that other 
nations have taken. As seen in the previous case study, the following sections analyze the 
process from the peace accords, which involves disarming, demobilizing, and 
reintegration of combatant troops, SSR, setting up transitional governing apparatuses, and 
conducting free and fair elections, along with implementing negotiated settlement 
objectives. The section addresses how Mozambique chose to implement the peace and 
begins to answer questions about why there is a resurgence of hostilities.  
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2. Mozambique’s Implementation of its Peace Accords  
The University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies has 
placed Mozambique at an overall completion rate for implementing their accords, since 
inception, at 92 percent.121 Although Mozambique had many setbacks implementing the 
Rome General Peace Accords from 1992, the peace in Mozambique advanced 
considerably, when taking into account the long period of relative peace and the 
establishment of democratic institutions. The renewal of hostilities questions 
conventional accepted approaches to peacebuilding and underscores the fact that a 
successful plan implemented after one civil war may not derive universally successful 
results. However, the following sections look briefly at Mozambique’s experience with 
the reforms, which are a testament to the liberal approach of peacebuilding including 
DDR, SSR, and changes to governance.  
a. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
The disarmament program specified in the peace agreements called for “weapons 
collection and destruction, one of the mandates of the United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique (UNOMOZ), which was established in October 1992.”122 Since, the DDR 
process was not ready to be executed soon after the peace accords, weapons from 
guerrilla forces were not collected or destroyed soon after demobilization. Although the 
mandate was realized in 1994, it was too late to ensure full effectiveness:  
UNOMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which 
belonged to paramilitary forces (out of a projected total of 49,806). This 
was significantly less than the amount of weapons which were known to 
be in Mozambique. Because of delays in the demobilization process, 
UNOMOZ was unable to complete the verification of weapons before the 
expiration of its mandate. Many of the weapons which were collected at 
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the assembly areas were of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better 
quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process.123 
The plan called for demobilization and integration to happen over a six-month 
period at which point there would be elections. However, the UN’s special envoy 
promised if there was a delay in the former, there would also be one with the elections. 
“We would not vote with arms,” he declared.124 The UN special envoy, Dr. Aldo Ajello, 
along with 6,500 troops and military observers were deployed in a support role. In the 
following year, “the UN mission in Mozambique identified 49 assembly points where 
soldiers from both sides would be confined, 29 for government troops and 20 for 
RENAMO.”125 The demobilization of rebel fighters began in 1994, with almost “75,000-
strong government army and the 20,000 rebels. A new army of 30,000 men was to be 
created in their place, with fighters drawn equally from each side,”126 and “10,000 of 
which ONUMOZ helped integrate into the new national army.”127 Despite relative 
success, the ONUMOZ experienced a host of issues including: “Timetables slipped, the 
local parties delayed compliance, budgets soared, parent UN agencies engaged in 
obstructionism, and UN resources on the ground [and especially the civilian police] were 
underutilized and worse.”128 Former combatants, lacked personal security as they no 
longer possessed weapons, and because of their diminished status within the assembly 
camps, they became unruly, attacking UN officials, taking locals hostage, and engaging 
in other nefarious activities.  
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The final UN report showed sweeping success despite the odds, dated December 
1994, with a “total of 91,691 (67,042 government and 24,649 RENAMO) soldiers had 
been registered by ONUMOZ. Some 78,078 soldiers (57,540 government and 20,538 
RENAMO) were demobilized, while some of the remainder joined the new army.”129 
The DDR process in Mozambique fundamentally changed the power structure. The 
assembly and demobilization of members of the RENAMO put an end to the hostile 
situation. RENAMO chose not to resume the conflict; the demobilization of ex-
combatants was a success. 
b. Security Sector Reform  
Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and 
children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries 
mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear they are 
consequently less likely to be able to access government services.130 Again the 
importance of emphasizing SSR is an absolute necessity for any nation to make the 
transition from civil war to sustained peace; otherwise, renewed armed conflict may 
persist. It is widely accepted that security sector institutions include the military, police 
forces, border security, customs officials, and correctional facilities. The security sector 
can more broadly include the judicial sector, which will oversee the prosecution of 
human rights and misuse of force. For purposes of this study, the two main institutions to 
implement reforms after conflict include the military and police forces. 
c. Military Reform 
Mozambique’s peace agreement mandated that government and RENAMO forces 
merge the military and guerrilla forces in equal numbers to establish a new 30,000 strong 
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military.131 The new senior level headquarters of the joint military would also be a 
combination of members from both warring parties. Although the DDR was slow, the 
new power sharing over the military was almost completely implemented during the five 
years that followed the peace agreement.  
The FRELIMO government was accepting of the integration between both parties 
into the newly created Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM). The agreement mandated 
that the troop strength, would be “30,000 (24,000 army, 4,000 air force, and 2,000 
navy).”132 The previous military establishment was disbanded and replaced by the new 
military in 1994. The high command consisted of generals, with one from each group, 
and this joint structure was mirrored throughout all echelons of the military. 
Despite what the peace agreement may have stipulated, the government and 
RENAMO troops were not equal, and many decided not to continue with the military but 
rather chose the life of a civilian. “On Aug. 24 President Joaquim Chissano, who had 
himself been demobilized as a general in the FPLM [People’s Forces of Liberation or 
Mozambique] on Aug. 12, reported that the new FADM would have only 11,000 of its 
intended 30,000 members operational by the elections in October.”133 
d. Police Reform 
As Malan describes, the “Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) was 
created on 31 December 1992 by Law 19/92, to replace the existing Mozambique 
People’s Police (PPM).”134 In 1994, the UN Civilian Police Component (CIVPOL) was 
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deployed in support of its existing mission to monitor Mozambique’s transition to a more 
integrated national police force. The element sent to observe policing activities was to 
ensure that the peace agreement gave some reassurance to the RENAMO, so civil rights 
and liberties were being upheld. The integration of RENAMO into the national police 
forces experienced issues such as inadequate training, a lack of screening criteria for new 
hires, and corrupt practices. The police grew “from an estimated 18,000 in 1994 to more 
than 21,000 in 1998.”135 Additionally, the CIVPOL supported the UN Mission to 
monitor the electoral elections and verify rights of citizens were respected, beginning 
with the elections in September 1994.136 The security sector of Mozambique was in 
disarray; therefore, international support was higher than in other post-conflict nations 
such as Angola. The international involvement helped with building a quasi-integrated 
military and police force. For both the military and police forces, the DDR process was 
defined by the peace agreement, international support, buyouts, and the daunting 
prospects that were not attractive to former rebels. 
C. MOVE TO A MORE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT 
For Mozambique, the DDR process was a benchmark to be achieved prior to 
hosting democratically open and free elections. After UN observers were satisfied with 
the progress, the next step was toward Presidential and legislative elections, which took 
place October 1994.137  
On the eve of the elections, the RENAMO announced its withdrawal from the 
poll. RENAMO decided to participate only after the intervention of the international 
community, including a message from the President of the Security Council; the active 
involvement of the Secretary-General in international efforts; as well as guarantees by 
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ONUMOZ and the international members of the CSC that the electoral process would be 
closely monitored.138 
The hesitation by RENAMO demonstrated a level of mistrust of the election 
system and gave the appearance that it was averse to participation until after assurances 
were given by outside agencies. The election results included “Mr. Chissano, received 
2,633,740 votes, amounting to 53.3 per cent of those cast in the presidential election. The 
leader of RENAMO, Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, received 1,666,965 votes, 
or 33.7 per cent.”139 In the legislative election, “FRELIMO received the largest share of 
the new Parliament’s 250 seats: FRELIMO—129, RENAMO—109, and UD—12.”140 
The elections appeared to be inclusive, but fair and equal power sharing within the 
government is one of the grievances most often voiced by RENAMO, which can be 
observed to date.  
D. MOZAMBIQUE FACTORS FOR RECURRENCE 
Peace is over in the country ... The responsibility lies with the Frelimo 
government because they didn’t want to listen to Renamo’s grievances. 
—Fernando Mazanga141 
The negative factors that spark the recurrence of civil war are defined in Chapter 
II as political exclusion, coercion, ethnic discrimination, economic grievances, weak 
states, greed, and destruction from the previous civil war. Each of these factors is drawn 
from theories by current academics and application of our case study analysis. While the 
authors consider the factors to be key motivators to renewed civil war, not all nations 
have experienced the same factors.  
As the following quotation demonstrates, the strong implementation of the peace 
accords has eroded, and since 2012, Mozambique has engaged in a renewed conflict:  
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To force the ruling party to change the electoral legislation and 
accommodate some of its remaining and, according to Renamo, “unfairly 
demobilized,” troops into the national army and police forces. The 
electoral legislation was duly amended to accommodate most of Renamo’s 
demands. However, the talks on the incorporation of Renamo’s forces and 
particularly on its format have stalled completely. While Renamo insists 
that re(integration) must allow its forces to occupy positions within all 
ranks (including high ranking ones) of the army and the national police 
force, the government wants Renamo to first provide it with a breakdown 
of its military personnel before discussion can recommence.142 
The most divisive issue that could push the current low-level insurgency back into 
a complete civil war is RENAMO’s demand to lay claim to specific territory, based on 
recent national elections. RENAMO’s argument is that the provinces in which they 
received “a majority of votes in the 2014 general election (Sofala, Manica, Tete, 
Nampula and Zambézia) be turned into autonomous territories under its rule.”143 A 
contested issue is whether Mozambique has free, fair, and transparent elections. In April 
2015, RENAMO claimed the electoral process was rigged and gave the election to the 
establishment without receiving a fair chance at winning. The following negative factors 
address the sudden divisional shift away from unification and peacebuilding.  
1. Political Exclusion 
RENAMO stated it’s “annulling its 1992 peace agreement with the ruling 
FRELIMO, following the capture of one of its bases by government forces.”144 Since the 
1992 peace agreement was signed, the post-conflict political sphere has been dominated 
by FRELIMO, which has won a majority of votes in almost every election since. The 
margin of wins is incrementally growing, “President Armando Guebuza’s administration, 
from 2004 to 2014, with Guebuza winning 75 percent of the votes and Frelimo gaining 
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191 of 250 parliamentary seats.”145 Since the initial elections, RENAMO has tried 
bargaining with the government to supplement the results to increase inclusive political 
power. This form of increasing political inclusion has never really changed the outcome 
of the elections, but it has reinforced RENAMO’s respect for the outcome and prevented 
hostilities. This practice diminished under President Guebuza, who was not sympathetic 
and became more aggressive as the ruling party.  
FRELIMO has dominated the political system in Mozambique, preventing greater 
political inclusion. Since RENAMO has not been fortunate at the voting booth, the 
FRELIMO no longer views them as a formidable partner for continued peace or an 
adversary that poses a real threat. The RENAMO has struck back at FRELIMO with a 
low-scale armed force, launching a resurgence with the use of attacks in 2013. This and 
subsequent acts demonstrate that a segment of the population still feels excluded and is 
now willing to gain political rights once again through the use of force as a means to 
regain those rights.  
RENAMO has been communicating their message of exclusion, which has 
garnered support mainly among younger voters. Dhlakama’s choice to renew hostilities 
in 2013 is not accepted by the generation that lived through the civil war, but the youth 
are more open to the use of force for greater political inclusion. The current recurrence in 
hostilities centers on issues dealing with RENAMO’s grievance related to needing greater 
political inclusion and for national unification. Although Mozambique’s civil war is 
complete, the peace accord signed and implemented makes it obvious that a portion of 
the population does not feel that commitments and guarantees under the provisions of the 
peace accord have improved. This is the case with RENAMO; they feel denied political 
inclusion and now want to separate from the mostly FRELIMO-led government.  
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When the conflict ended in Mozambique, the DDR process took some time before 
implementing, and as previously noted, the number of weapons collected did not equal 
what was left behind from the civil war. The Mozambique Civil war ended with a 
negotiated peace settlement; however, the RENAMO leader retained a security detail of 
over 150 rebels, due to the lack of trust in placing his security in the hands of the 
government. Additionally, RENAMO retained some of its military facilities. Therefore, 
trust is a vital element.  
During and after the civil war, the government has been primarily 
occupied with promoting a notion of “national unity”—to the point of 
silencing opposition. A prominent example is the 2015 murder of the 
constitutional law professor Gilles Cistac. He had defended the 
constitutional viability of Renamo’s proposition of autonomous 
provinces—a serious challenge to Frelimo’s national unity refrain. (There 
is no evidence Cistac was killed by Frelimo sympathizers, but analysts 
have cited his opinions on provincial autonomy as the likely cause of his 
murder.146 
The situation is one of coercing and silencing the opposition, all in the name of 
“national unity.” Mozambique keeps the façade to attract and keep international support 
or aid.  
3. Ethnic Discrimination  
Mozambique was not a civil war motivated by ethnic divisions. Rather the 
warring parties’ wanted inclusive political power and economic opportunities. 
RENAMO, which hoped to usurp FRELIMO’s control, was established by white 
Rhodesians outside of Mozambique to destabilize the FRELIMO government and stop 
the spread of communism. RENAMO was then given to the apartheid regime in South 
Africa as its main supporter after the demise of Rhodesia.  
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4. Economic Grievances  
Prior to Mozambique’s civil war, the economic situation was different from the 
one in neighboring Angola. Early on both warring parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, 
lacked sufficient funding to sustain the war for are two main reasons. First, 
Mozambique’s natural resources were not yet explored or exploited to their fullest 
potential. Secondly, at the time of independence, Mozambique was considered one of the 
least developed industrial producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, both warring 
parties targeted each other’s ability to develop the necessary resources. RENAMO placed 
pressure on the economy by targeting agricultural and industrial sectors, along with 
logistical routes used by FRELIMO. FRELIMO was successful at taking over 
RENAMO’s economic sectors in central Mozambique. Thus, the economic situation 
toward the end of the civil war in Mozambique grew bleak. In the early 1990s, prior to 
the negotiated settlement, mass starvation from drought forced the two parties to 
collaborate. The FRELIMO regime reached an agreement for transport of food into 
RENAMO held areas, demonstrating a unifying need. The gross national product (GNP) 
is often a measure of the economic health of a nation:  
The GNP per capita had dropped dramatically from U.S. $270 in 1985 to 
U.S. $170 in 1986. Another landslide drop occurred between 1986 and 
1987, when it further decreased to U.S. $80. After it had remained at 
approximately the same level from 1987 to 1991, it fell to a dramatic low 
of U.S. $65 in 1992.147 
The domestic economy gradually eroded toward the end of the civil war and 
served as a major catalyst for the eventual agreement for a negotiated settlement. Due to 
the adverse development of the economy and continued fighting, as well as inadequate 
distribution of resources, Mozambique has again found itself stumbling back into 
hostilities. As RENAMO’s leadership feels inclusionary policies are eroding, it uses that 
narrative as a recruitment tool to motivate Mozambique’s disenfranchised citizens and to 
rebuild RENAMO’s military wing.  
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A recent World Bank report on the economic situation in Mozambique noted that 
“the main findings are that as a result of strong growth in incomes in the agricultural 
sector as well as the non-agricultural sector, poverty declined rapidly in Mozambique 
over the 96/97-–02/03 period in rural areas and in most urban areas.”148 However, 
“despite this good progress, more than 50% of the population remains in poverty 
today.”149 Furthermore, many of the citizens lack safe water and adequate housing, 
making it difficult to change the situation for over half of the population. If Mozambique 
citizens cannot meet their basic needs, they will easily be motivated to participate in 
armed conflict.  
5. Weak States  
Mozambique’s majority-led government by FRELIMO does not have adequate 
control over all the provinces within its sovereign borders. This can be observed from 
RENAMO’s desire to take control of those provinces entirely. As reported by 
International Business Times on March 21, 2016, the leader of RENAMO stated, 
“Dhlakama, meanwhile, has time and again shown his intentions of taking over the six 
central and northern provinces he says should be under Renamo control—Tete, Manica, 
Sofala, Zambezia, Nampula and Niassa.”150 This was reiterated by a RENAMO Member 
of Parliament, Jose Mantiegas, who said that “the guerrilla group would at least start to 
govern in six provinces this month, as promised.” The demands by RENAMO are due to 
the perception that the government has failed to honor key mandates of the 1992 peace 
accord, including properly integrating RENAMO combatants into Mozambique’s 
military.  
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The FRELIMO majority government has tried to heed some of RENAMO’s 
demands by making changes to the electoral process to ensure greater transparency in 
election administration. It has agreed to come to the table to discuss renewed SSR and the 
integration of Dhlakama’s security forces, but it has not been successful in reaching such 
a deal. Since no tangible concessions have been made by the government, Dhlakama 
continues to try to appoint officials in provinces where the group has won a majority. The 
rationale that RENAMO has for additional attacks is beginning to gain favor among its 
constituency, if the issues of self-governance and fair integration into the military and 
police forces are not properly addressed. RENAMO is arguing that because it has won a 
majority it should have complete control over those provinces. Last, considering 
RENAMO’s presence is more concentrated in certain parts of the country than 
FRELIMO’s, RENAMO’s legitimacy among populations in those areas is strong.  
6. Greed of FRELIMO 
In the post-conflict period, while Mozambique implemented its peace agreement, 
with the help of international support, previously untapped natural resource wealth has 
been discovered. As political power has become more concentrated in the hands of the 
FRELIMO, so has economic wealth. Now, the economic payoff of political inclusion, 
including access to the Mozambique’s natural resource expansion, has increased. 
Mozambique’s reserves of natural resources have been confirmed, but production has yet 
to fully take hold with some of the region’s most significant untapped natural gas and 
coal deposits.  
Dhlakama claimed the FRELIMO did not distribute equally returns from 
discovered natural resources.151 In fact, an International Monetary Fund report confirms 
that income inequality in Mozambique has continuously increased, despite strong 
economic growth.152 Additionally, the geography of Mozambique demonstrates the 
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inequality in the central-northern parts of Mozambique, where RENAMO holds a strong 
level of influence. There has been unrest related to the extreme income inequality in 
Mozambique:  
Riots in 1995, 2008, 2010, and 2012 related to increased food and 
transport prices show the youth’s frustration over access to resources and 
political power. The youth participating in these riots did not experience 
the suffering of the civil war—a reason why older Mozambicans 
expressed concern in conversations with me that war may return. Recent 
reports of young armed men at Renamo rallies have contributed to the fear 
that Renamo may be able to recruit the young and discontented.153  
The recent unrest and income inequality could point to practices stemming from 
greed by the majority-led government. The unequal distribution of the GDP from the 
resources of the nation has generated several conflicts. The accusations by Dhlakama are 
highlighting the imbalances in political power and unequal distribution of resources. 
Thus, in the post-conflict period the nation is proving less economically beneficial to 
those under RENAMO control, which could spark a new civil war.  
7. Destruction from the Previous Civil War  
The civil war in Mozambique gradually degraded the economy and caused major 
destruction to physical property, especially in rural areas. During the post-peace 
settlement period, many internally displaced citizens returned to their homes and initiated 
reconstruction efforts. During this period, almost all economic factors improved; 
however, reconstructing the physical infrastructure of the nation fell short of supporting 
common citizens. The level of affluence improved for all citizens slightly; however, 
Mozambique remains one of the poorest nations in Africa. The rural economy to date has 
the capacity to grow substantially with proper reforms and policies to lift rural 
households out of the trap of poverty and subsistence farming. The rural economy has 
never fully recovered. The stronghold of RENAMO supporters primarily resides in areas 
that have not recovered from the civil war or have not had substantial improvement. The 
feeling of exclusion in these areas is real, not perceived, and is used to continue the 
polarization of the country. The aftermath of the civil war had over one million dead from 
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fighting and starvation, along with many more displaced from their homes.154 Finally, the 
reconciliation process is forgotten by the youth of Mozambique and the mistrust and 
insecurity of the older generation make the recent acts of aggression a foreshadowing of a 
possible return to war.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Mozambique’s internal security situation is volatile. The armed wing of 
RENAMO is fighting with government security forces, while RENAMO training bases 
were recently seized and prominent leaders killed. There is no formal agreement to end 
hostilities. The thin line between small internal conflict and a full-scale civil war is 
becoming more blurred. After more than 20 years of a relatively durable peace, it would 
seem many of the issues rooted in the original civil war were addressed. However, since 
the peace agreement and implementation of its mandates, both uneven political and 
economic inclusion of RENAMO have eroded slowly. The majority party is 
marginalizing the RENAMO party and its supporters. The authors hope that the case 
study presented has given a thorough analysis of Mozambique’s transition from civil war 
to sustained peace to renewed conflict. The specific factors outlined in the case study 
give examples of what has ultimately led to renewed internal conflict in Mozambique.  
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V. PEACE ATTEMPTS IN COLOMBIA  
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the oldest terrorist 
group in Latin America and has been the cause for much of the bloodshed that has 
plagued Colombia. President Uribe’s Government, from 2002 to 2010, adopted a counter-
terrorism strategy combined with U.S. military support for the war against drugs and 
terrorism. During the protracted conflict of nearly seven years, the Colombian military 
has reduced the FARC’s force of nearly 20,000 armed combatants to one with barely 
8,000. On August 7, 2010, while campaigning for his first term in office, President 
Santos promised to continue the counter-terrorism strategy led by his predecessor, 
President Alvaro Uribe Velez, to defeat the FARC militarily. However, Santos shifted on 
this campaign promise and decided not to continue with Uribe’s hard line approach. 
Instead, he decided to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement. Therefore, 
President Santos, like Colombian presidents of the 1980s and 1990s has decided to 
gamble on negotiation as part of his strategy to end more than 50 years of war in 
Colombia. The Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos has reached a preliminary 
peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, with the FARC. 
The first part of this chapter provides a historic chronology of Colombian 
administrations since the 1950s, which have been negotiating with internal insurgents 
and terrorist groups. The second part of this chapter analyzes why President Santos 
decided to negotiate with the FARC instead of continuing the strategy of defeating the 
group militarily. It is a high-risk approach; according to Hirotaka Ohmura, “Military 
victory is more likely to lead to stable peace than a negotiated peace settlement, because 
through victory the balance of power becomes imbalanced between the parties 
involved.”155  
A. MORE THAN 60 YEARS OF ENDEAVORS TO ACHIEVE PEACE  
The country and population of Colombia have a desire and an imperative need to 
shift from a protracted conflict to lasting peace. Colombia is characterized as having the 
                                                 
155 Ohmura, “Termination and Recurrence of Civil War,” 378. 
 74
longest lasting armed insurgency in Latin America, with multiple attempts at negotiating 
with insurgent groups in order to achieve peace. The history of Colombia’s conflicts and 
peace processes have their origin in the second half of the 20th century, when a series of 
events marked the beginning of a period known simply as “La Violencia.” On April 9, 
1948, in the midst of the struggle between the main Colombian liberal and conservative 
political parties, the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, who was running for the 
presidency, was assassinated.156  
The assassination of Gaitan unleashed an unprecedented level of violence both in 
the countryside and in the cities, leading to the formation of peasant led self-defense 
groups and liberal and communist guerrillas. The aforementioned groups were created in 
order to protect themselves from the police, who had been politicized, and therefore 
supported the conservative party ruling the country at that time. Ricardo Arias, a 
Colombian historian, describes the impact of Gaitan’s assassination: “On April 9, 1948, 
more than a temporary disruption of peace, it represented the beginning of a profound 
social disintegration, the collapse of the traditional order.”157 “La Violencia” period 
between 1948 and 1958 was one of the bloodiest periods in Colombian 
history,158 characterized by assassinations, assaults, harassment, destruction of private 
property, terrorism, and citizens being victimized based on their political affiliation.  
In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the presidency after a nonviolent 
coup d’etat and produced the first attempt at peace during his tenure. General Rojas 
proposed amnesty for the different groups created during “La Violencia,” but this 
amnesty was limited to disarmament and demobilization. In reality, however the amnesty 
did not provide any kind of reintegration process into civilian life for several hundred 
liberal Colombian guerrillas. Despite Rojas’ effort, the possibility for peace vanished 
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because the government was not able to provide security for those demobilized, many of 
whom were murdered.159  
Security is the most important factor in ensuring the non-recurrence of 
hostilities. Dirk Salomons, Director of the Humanitarian Policy Track at the School of 
International Public Affairs at Columbia University, reaffirms the importance of security: 
“The basic need for freedom from violence is an absolute prerequisite for any effective 
post-conflict recovery process. After, armed conflict subsides, if there is no prospect of 
security; then, there is no hope for a common future.”160 The Colombian government 
could not provide enough guarantees of security, due to a lack of effective presence in 
some regions of the country. Therefore, the government’s incapacity enabled the 
emergence of new armed groups, influenced by communist doctrine.  
In 1958, the decade-old conflict ended with a bipartisan pact called the “National 
Front,” lasting to 1974.161 The “National Front” is considered to be the second attempt at 
delivering peace to Colombia. During the period of the “National Front,” the conservative 
and liberal political parties agreed to share power for a 16-year period, in which every 
four years the presidency would alternate between the parties. At that time, the political 
agreement completely excluded the existing Communist Party in Colombia, which 
became one of the reasons for the FARC’s initial struggle against the 
government. Ricardo Arias, explains the “National Front” by affirming:  
The National Front was mainly designed to end the old two-party 
conflicts. From that point of view, it was a complete success: In the mid- 
sixties, liberals and conservatives no longer settled their differences 
through violent attacks. However, the National Front failed to actually 
convene the nation as a whole. Very quickly, an increasingly numerous 
and radical opposition felt that the agreement had neglected the interests 
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of other sectors. The emergence of several guerrilla movements was proof 
of that.162 
The exclusive nature of the “National Front” and struggles over land ownership 
caused the emergence of the main guerrilla groups in Colombia known as the FARC, the 
ELN, EPL, and the M-19.163 
The FARC was formed in Colombia in May 1964, due to a multitude of 
factors. One of these factors was the turmoil that existed in Latin America after the 
Cuban revolution, and the desire of communist organizations to achieve the same results 
obtained by Fidel Castro and his “revolutionary comrades” on the Caribbean island. Hal 
Brands underscores this turmoil in his book Latin America’s Cold War: “Castro’s revolt 
reverberated strongly within Latin America, insurgencies informed by domestic 
grievances and energized by the Cuban example waged destructive campaigns throughout 
Central America and South America.”164 A supporting factor for new recruits to the 
FARC was the high level of poverty and inequality seen mainly in rural areas of 
Colombia during the 1960s. Therefore, the FARC had the perfect reason to adopt 
Marxist—Maoist ideology of “popular warfare based on the concept of class struggle”165 
in Colombia. It relied on farmers to try to achieve its main objective: “Overthrow the 
government, and establish a communist regime.” In his book, FARC the Longest 
Insurgency, Gary Leech describes FARC and its root cause: “Guerrilla forces operated in 
isolated parts of rural Colombia where they sought to exploit appalling local poverty and 
the inability or unwillingness of the governments to address the basic needs of a long 
suffering population.”166 The FARC clearly understood how to leverage and manipulate 
the population’s misfortunes, making the population believe that only through acts of 
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terrorism would they achieve their objectives. According to the FARC, terrorism was the 
key to achieving better living conditions. The FARC used the peasants’ grievances over 
land re-distribution as another motivational issue to support their cause.  
The environment of economic insecurity in Colombia during the 1960s supported 
the mobilization of the peasant population to act, making recruitment efforts by the 
FARC easy. The Colombian economy during this period was in a deplorable situation, 
with poverty concentrated in the rural areas. In addition, an extreme inequality of land 
distribution existed: “In 1960, a mere one percent of landowners owned 55 percent 
of Colombia’s arable land, while 62.5 percent of the country’s farmers subsisted with less 
than 1 percent of the national territory suitable for agriculture.”167 For example, poverty 
in rural areas was 72 percent, in 1985, while in urban areas 32 percent.168 These statistics 
show the problems of the Colombian economy, which the FARC recognized as an 
opportunity to justify terrorist activities and attempts to overthrow the government. The 
FARC used terrorist acts to force the government to succumb to negotiation.  
Since the early 1980s, Colombian presidents have tried some form of negotiation 
with the different terrorist groups that commit crimes, making the practice common 
enough that it is considered an unwritten norm. Follow-on presidential administrations 
have assumed they have a moral obligation to seek a peaceful solution to the violence 
that has faced their country. Therefore, they have all considered a negotiated agreement 
as the preferred method to achieve peace. Mitchell Reiss, former U.S. Special Envoy to 
the Northern Ireland Peace Process, explains why government officials decide to 
negotiate with insurgents or terrorists, “The moral taint of dealing with terrorists, which 
none denied, was outweighed by the chance to end violence and achieve the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people.”169 However, as soon as the terrorists start to 
negotiate, they do not have an incentive to find a solution; rather in the interest of time, 
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the longer the duration of a negotiation, the more time available to reorganize and 
accommodate a new strategy. Reiss argues, “Governments usually expend a good deal of 
time, a great deal of effort, and the investment of significant political capital to bring a 
terrorist group to the negotiation table in the first place.”170 A presidential term in 
Colombia lasts four years and this usually works in favor of the insurgents or terrorist 
groups and not the government. The Colombian government’s institutional time 
constraint forces the government to provide generous concessions to insurgents and 
terrorists in order to persuade them to negotiate and reach an agreement. 
During former President Belisario Betancourt’s administration (1982–1986) talks 
were initiated with the FARC and ELN.171 In March 1984, the first ceasefire agreement 
with the FARC was reached. The government pledged to establish guarantees for the 
FARC to participate in politics and to unify as a political party, called the “Union 
Patriotica.” The party comprised communists, indigenous people, students, unions, and 
ex-combatants. However, the government’s inability to provide security for the 
combatants played against the probability of a final agreement. A few years after the 
creation of the “Union Patriotica” party, it would be literally exterminated by more than 
2,300 militant deaths.172 Betancourt’s peace process with the FARC and ELN led to the 
release of terrorists and insurgents from prison, without requiring any commitment from 
those groups.173 The FARC and ELN exploited these concessions, by redesigning their 
strategy and reorganizing their forces, in order to continue with their goal of 
overthrowing the government. 
The efforts of President Betancourt to move Colombia toward peace failed. 
However, Betancourt’s government should be recognized for its change in approach 
toward political speech. There were two elements introduced into the national discourse 
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on the matter: First, acknowledgement that all armed rebel groups were political actors 
gave them a voice to open dialogue. Second, Colombia, like other countries in Latin 
America, required a process of increasing democratic openness. The later approach 
toward democratization was a radical change in the Colombian political system. 
Betancourt thought that the fundamental step towards the Colombian process of 
democratization was negotiating with the guerrillas on the basis of their likelihood of 
participating in a reformed political system.174 It was the first time that the Colombian 
government tried to negotiate on condition of equality for an illegal armed group. 
Another first was the Colombian president recognizing structural causes that led to the 
armed conflict in Colombia— distribution of land; access to health and education; and 
political exclusion. During Betancourt’s administration, a ceasefire agreement was 
reached, and the discussion of the major problems of the country began. Unfortunately, 
no final agreements were ever reached. Lack of guarantees for tolerance of political 
opposition, attacks on civilians, and paramilitary presence affected the peace process; 
therefore, the truce did not last long, and peace could not be achieved.  
Former President Virgilio Barco took office after Betancourt. At the beginning of 
his term, President Barco promised an uncompromising stance against any armed actor 
existing in Colombia. However, the level of violence in the country changed his mind and 
made him seek an agreement with the terrorists. By the time President Virgilio Barco’s 
administration ended in 1990, the government tried to fight not only the FARC and the 
ELN, but also the EPL, M-19, and drug cartels, especially the powerful Medellín Cartel 
that at the time was the most violent group in Colombia.  
The M-19 was gradually reduced in strength and effectiveness through sustained 
attacks from the government, prompting negotiations with Barco’s government and his 
conciliatory policies. Between January 1989 and March 1990, after several negotiations, 
Barco’s government achieved demobilization and dissolution of this armed organization, 
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and subsequently the creation of their own political party.175 Colombian researcher and 
Professor Mario Ramirez-Orozco, Ph.D. in Latin American studies and author of Peace 
without Guile, explains Barco’s peace process: 
A space for peace was opened, allowing the demobilization of M-19, the 
armed movement Quintin Lame, a percentage of the EPL and the PRT 
[Partido revolutionario de los Trabajadores]. Most of those demobilized 
were asking for social and political inclusion. Therefore, that political 
inclusion would create an opportunity for a new constitution in 1991. 
However, this new constitution did not take into account FARC and ELN, 
who continued committing crimes.176  
This attempt at peace was partially effective, it secured the incorporation to 
normalize life for some guerrilla groups, but was a partial peace, and it left out the main 
insurgency groups, including the FARC and ELN. However, the FARC and ELN did not 
want peace. At the time of the new constitution, they were interested in their principal 
goal: “Overthrowing the government.” The 1990s would become a decade for the 
relentless use of violence to achieve their objective.  
With the fall of the USSR at the end of 1991, the FARC demonstrated its ability 
to adapt. It was expected that the FARC would end at the same time as the fall of the 
USSR, along with its ideology of communism. However, this organization showed a high 
level of flexibility to conform to a new situation. David Kilcullen explains this flexibility 
in his article “Colombia a Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace,” asserting: 
“With the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s, the prospect of external support 
receded even further, and narcotics became a key source of funding, along with 
kidnapping and extortion. Drugs brought in an estimated $3.5 billion annually by 2005, 
or 45 percent of FARC’s funding.”177 The income derived from illicit activities allowed 
the FARC to recruit numerous followers and strengthen its influential presence in areas 
                                                 
175 “25 Años de un Proceso de Paz,” [25 Years of a Peace Process] El Espectador, accessed August 
24, 2016, http://www.elespectador.com/files/especiales/procesodepazm19/index.html. 
176 David Baracaldo, “La Mala Suerte de los 10 Intentos de Paz que ha Tenido Colombia” [The Bad 
Luck of the Peace Process in Colombia], accessed June 29, 2016, http://www.kienyke.com/politica/los-
diez-intentos-fallidos-de-proceso-de-paz-en-colombia/. 
177 David Kilcullen and Greg Mills, “Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace,” 
PRISM 5, no 3 (2015): 109. 
 81
of settlement, but above all else, to diversify holdings more strategically by extending its 
network throughout Colombia. Such diversification included livestock and oil rich areas 
near the Magdalena Medio, Cordoba, and Casanare and agro-industrial regions such as 
Urabá, which bordered neighboring nations. These interests were vital to key logistical 
hubs on the Pacific coast and the Caribbean, for ease of exporting drugs and importing 
arms. 
Over the last 30 years, with nearly continuous violence perpetuated by the cocaine 
trade, Colombia has suffered a tragedy due to the challenges against traditional state 
security and the formalized economy. The profits produced by illicit activities of criminal 
organizations, such as the Medellín Cartel, the Cali Cartel, and of course, the FARC, have 
not only sustained these groups but supported exponential growth. The Medellín Cartel, 
once headed by the infamous Pablo Escobar, accumulated a fortune in drug money in the 
1980s, using it to initiate a terrorist offensives against the government. The nefarious 
methods used by the Medellín Cartel included the use of car bombs and targeted killings 
of government officials such as police officers, judges, politicians, or any individual who 
could not be coopted. Those coercive methods were used by the Medellín Cartel to force 
the government to give them privileges, such as putting an end to extradition of fellow 
cartel members to the United States.  
Former President Cesar Gaviria was in office from 1990 to 1994.178 He took 
office amid rising violence after Luis Carlos Galan the presidential candidate from the 
Liberal Party who was assassinated,179 along with the murders of two others candidates 
on the left, including the M- 19 candidate, Carlos Pizarro.180 The administration of 
Gaviria wanted to find a solution to the armed conflict in Colombia and discuss major 
national security issues. The guerrillas intended to discuss the national crisis, but they 
were not interested in a solution to the conflict. However, in March 1992, Gaviria’s 
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administration established peace talks with the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar 
(CGSB) composed of the FARC, ELN, and EPL remains in Tlaxcala, Mexico.181 
Additionally, President Gaviria attempted to negotiate with the Medellín Cartel. 
Gaviria received congressional approval for non-extradition of Colombian citizens to the 
United States for drug trafficking, using it as an incentive to meet the principle request of 
Pablo Escobar and his Medellín Cartel lieutenants. The latter request was elaborated on 
by David Bushnell, one of the world’s leading experts on the history of Colombia, “The 
new president proposed that any trafficker who voluntarily surrendered to the Colombian 
Authorities and pleaded guilty to one or more charges would not be extradited to the 
United States but instead tried in Colombia, where sentences were both lighter and more 
predictable than in the U.S. judicial system.”182 However, despite the government’s 
concessions for an appeal to peace, Pablo Escobar continued trafficking drugs, killing, 
corrupting institutions, and doing anything within his power to expand his criminal 
network to gain more power. Therefore, the government changed its position and decided 
to wage a war against the Medellín Cartel, which led to the successful killing of Pablo 
Escobar and dismantling of his organization. 
Former President Ernesto Samper served as president of Colombia from 1994 to 
1998,183 succeeding Cesar Gaviria. President Samper was inept at negotiations with 
terrorist groups and governing the country. During his administration, Samper was 
devoted to defending his own integrity from allegations of corruption and accusations of 
accepting drug money to finance his campaign.184 As a result, the Samper government 
was ineffective at addressing the issue of internal security, and then the FARC took 
control of the drug trade left behind from the Medellín Cartel. After the fall of 
Pablo Escobar and the disintegration of the Medellín Cartel, the FARC found a unique 
opportunity to seize a very lucrative illicit business. The financial resources obtained 
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through the drug trade were substantially more than the FARC had previously received 
from the international support of communist sympathizers: “Millions of drug 
dollars provided FARC with a kind of steroidal boost allowing the rebel army to expand 
from 6,000 members in 1982 to about 20,000 fighters at the peak of its military power in 
the early 2000s.”185 The substantial increase in funding from the drug trade supported the 
FARCs ability for expansion of personnel and support for the transition from a second 
stage “strategic equilibrium” to a “strategic offensive.” The result was the unleashing of a 
wave of violence and terrorist attacks against the government, its institutions, and the 
civilian population.  
In the late 1990s, according to Colombian government statistics, as a result of 
financing from the drug trade, FARC offensive operations increased from two to seven 
actions daily. Likewise, they increased acts of sabotage and terrorism in Colombia’s most 
significant cities, using explosive devices, which targeted security forces.186 The FARC 
discovered that the drug trade was not only lucrative, but enabled the purchase of 
weapons and explosives, as well as increased recruitment. Colombia almost reached the 
threshold of becoming a “failed state” due to a combination of violence, drug trafficking, 
and the government’s inability to address the security situation, which de-legitimized the 
government. However, President Samper’s attempts to move toward peace most 
prominently were carried out with the ELN in the city of Mainz in Germany.187 The end 
result was void of achieving any progress. 
In 1998, former President Andres Pastrana was elected president of Colombia, 
largely due to his promises of potentially reaching an agreement with the FARC. The 
FARC publicly expressed its support for President Pastrana before the general elections. 
Nina Serrano, a specialist in National Security Affairs, asserted that President Pastrana, 
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“Responded to FARC´s request to create a demilitarized zone and ordered the withdrawal 
of security forces from five municipalities for 90 days.”188 In exchange, the FARC 
simply had to agree to start peace negotiations. The FARC came to the negotiation table 
with the upper hand from its increase by almost 20,000 armed combatants and their 
ability to wreak havoc.  
The peace process during the Pastrana administration lasted for more than three 
years, but was systemically troubled by its lack of an effective agenda, irregularities in 
determining the demilitarized zone, and an unwillingness of FARC members to come to 
agreement on issues. The demilitarized zone gave the FARC a legitimized space, where 
they could train, rest, and be internationally recognized, to the credit of journalists who 
sought recognition by speaking with the oldest guerrilla group in Latin America. The 
FARC has historically set a precedent by using negotiations with the government to its 
advantage, as explained by Reiss: “Negotiations were merely tactics to give the terrorists 
time to rest, rearm, and prepare the next round of war.” 189 On February 20, 2002, 
Andres Pastrana decided to end the peace process with the FARC, after the kidnapping of 
Congressman Luis Eduardo Gechem by members of the rebel group on a commercial 
flight.190 President Pastrana ordered the Colombian Armed Forces to recover the 
demilitarized zone and initiate an offensive against the FARC throughout Colombia’s 
territory. As a response to the government offensive, the FARC increased its terrorist 
attacks.  
However, concurrent with the peace process, President Pastrana began 
transforming the Colombian Military Forces through Plan Colombia, with support from 
the United States, to directly combat drug trafficking and similar organizations profiting 
from the drug trade.  
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Former President Alvaro Uribe took office on August 7, 2002, as the new 
President of Colombia, succeeding Andres Pastrana.191 President Uribe came to power 
with the promise to increase military efforts against the FARC and increase overall public 
security levels in Colombia. Therefore, Uribe continued the military transformation 
started under the previous administration. The goal was to ensure governmental presence 
in almost every city, town, or village in Colombia, by using state security and military 
organizations. With increased military presence throughout Colombia, the FARC were 
less likely to occupy ungoverned spaces and freely conduct illicit activities. 
As soon as public security was established in regions not previously having a 
military presence, it would signal to the central government that other government 
institutions could move into those spaces in order to offer basic services such as health, 
education, and justice, among others. This strategy was called the “Democratic Security 
Policy,” prompting a significant increase in the number of members in the military and 
police, and then the overall professionalism and initiative for the development of joint 
operations transpired. The FARC had been delegitimized after terrorist attacks that ended 
the peace process with former President Andres Pastrana. The FARC continued to lose 
the support of the population with every occurrence of a new terrorist offensive. The 
strategy developed by former President Uribe’s administration received daily support 
from the Colombian population. Michael Freeman, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, explains what happens when terrorism does not work:  
The accepted level of violence by the population will rise as they get used 
to terrorism. Thus, the amount of violence required to create a condition of 
terror is higher. Over time, then, terrorist violence actually loses its 
effectiveness. If it terrorizes the population less, the terrorist group will be 
less likely to be able to coerce the state in the way that it desires. When 
this occurs, acts of violence no longer have the capacity to terrorize the 
population.192  
Colombians began to feel less afraid to report attacks and actions of the FARC. 
The FARCs inability to effectively coerce and extort the government and the civilian 
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population made the FARC lose credibility. Colombians protested against the FARC with 
the largest demonstration in the history of Colombia, taking to the streets to say “No 
more FARC,” and thus repudiate the terrorist actions carried out by this group.193 The 
FARC received the most important military setbacks in its history. Three out of its seven 
leaders were killed in military actions, something that had never happened previously to 
this organization. In addition, its leader “Manuel Marulanda” died in the jungle due to a 
heart attack.194 Marulanda was one of the FARC’s founders when the FARC was created 
in 1964, and the absence of one of its most charismatic leaders in the terrorist group 
pushed them toward decline. The death of Marulanda had a lasting impact on the 
members of the FARC. Michael Freeman argues, “Without a charismatic or visionary 
leader, the group may face a renewed collective action problem. Potential and existing 
members may be less willing to fight and possibly die for less inspiring or charismatic 
leaders.”195 The death of their leaders created an environment of low morale among 
members of the FARC, and the number of demobilized increased. FARC leader Ivan 
Rios was killed by one of his bodyguards, and to prove it, the guilty bodyguard cut off 
Ivan Rios’ hand and gave it to the authorities.196 Therefore, internal to the FARC, the 
environment became insidious and very divisive. The organization was not just losing its 
leadership, it was also losing power, cohesion, and morale. This is corroborated by Arias, 
who writes, “Uribe did not defeat the guerrillas, as was his intention. But he left it 
seriously wounded, cornered; more importantly, completely delegitimized in public 
opinion, with few exceptions, to the international community.”197 
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The peace process held in during the tenure of President Uribe was with the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The only agreements that occurred between 
Uribe’s government and FARC were over humanitarian agreements to free hostages in 
FARC’s control. The talks with the AUC were conducted in Ralito, in the province of 
Cordoba, Colombia, and achieved the demobilization of about 30,000 members of the 
AUC, and the release of key paramilitary leaders. The demobilization of the 
paramilitaries had permanent unresolved issues of impunity, because few details became 
public. Colombian citizens were ill informed to develop an educated opinion on the 
agreement, and further controversy arose because some elements of the organization did 
not demobilize, but rather formed a new emerging armed group known simply as a 
criminal gang. According to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, of 3,500 
demobilized paramilitary members who returned to commit a crime, 2,290 were arrested. 
The magnitude of the phenomenon of recidivism is hardly calculable.198 
B. NEW PRESIDENT, NEW STRATEGY  
Juan Manuel Santos on August 7, 2010, was sworn in as president of 
Colombia.199 Santos had served as defense minister during the Uribe administration. 
Santos came to power fully supported and promoted by previous President Uribe, and 
promised to continue the hard line policies of his predecessor against the FARC. 
Although in his inaugural address he spoke of continuing the policy of Uribe—
democratic security policy—Santos also sent a message to the terrorist groups, assessing 
their interest to negotiate, something he had never mentioned during his campaign for the 
presidency: 
With the consolidation of the democratic security we have made progress 
in this direction like never before, but still have some way to go. Reaching 
this end will remain a priority, and I ask the new leadership of our Armed 
Forces to continue giving results and producing compelling advancements. 
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At the same time I want to reiterate what I have said in the past: The door 
to dialogue is not locked.200 
With this statement, Santos opened the door to begin a dialogue and FARC agreed 
to negotiate with the government again, this time with Santos’ administration. On 
October 16, 2012, two years after starting the mandate of Santos, it was made official in 
Oslo, Norway.201 The opening of negotiations commenced between the Colombian 
government and the FARC; a few months later, talks moved to Havana, Cuba, where 
talks have recently ended. The critics and comments, against and in favor of Santos’ 
approach with FARC, did not wait. Especially, from the majority of his constituency who 
elected him to continue with the purpose of accomplishing a military defeat of the FARC. 
What prompted Santos’ decision to change his approach from during the 
campaign to when he took office? Why did Santos make the decision to negotiate with 
the FARC, when it has been proven in previous negotiations that the FARC’s strategy is 
to use negotiations to recover from battle fatigue? Santos’ arguments were mainly based 
on the length of the protracted war in Colombia, almost 50 years to the date he took 
office, and the magnitude of the damage that the war has caused throughout all this time. 
Despite the military successes of recent years and the decline in the strategy of the 
FARC, this homegrown terrorist group continues to be financed by the drug trade. If an 
end to the conflict is not achieved by the current negotiations, the same vicious cycle of 
war is certain to continue for many more years in Colombia. The FARC simply redeploy, 
enter into a stage of resilience, avoid becoming small, get reorganized, and wait to attack 
again. This argument is quite valid considering the arguments of James Fearon, Professor 
of Political Science at Stanford University: “Civil wars last a long time when neither side 
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can disarm the other, causing a military stalemate.”202 The stalemate makes a negotiated 
settlement a feasible option to solve the conflict. 
President Santos’ second argument for a settlement is the economic cost of the 
war. In the latest report of the global peace index, expenditures made by Colombia to 
address violence reached $139.5 billion by 2015, an increase of 58 percent from 2008. 
This represents 30 percent of the GDP of Colombia.203 Negotiations with the FARC 
obviously allow investment in the war, which may reduce funding that could be diverted 
to cover other needs in Colombia, such as education, health, and infrastructure, among 
others. Reiss observes about the cost of war: “Killing or capturing every terrorist is not 
operationally possible, politically feasible, or financially affordable.”204 Because of these 
high costs, the military solution is not the best option, and the decision to opt for a 
negotiated settlement is the better solution. 
Harvey Kline, in his book Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of 
Colombian President Andres Pastrana, which was written and published five years 
before the start of the peace process between the Santos government and the FARC, 
includes an argument that could be considered one of the reasons why Santos changed his 
thinking. “The president in Colombia sees himself and is seen by his close followers as a 
messiah and often is concerned with his place in history.”205 If Uribe is to be 
remembered for his war against the FARC, then Santos would be remembered for having 
finally achieved the peace: “I want peace. And of course I wish that history remembered 
me as the president who made peace in Colombia.”206 
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C. CONCLUSIONS  
Many factors influence the decision to talk with terrorists and insurgents: the 
duration of war, the number of deaths that terrorism has caused, and the destruction that 
terrorism has generated, among others. Because of these factors, leaders seek, through a 
negotiated agreement, to solve the conflict with terrorists and insurgents. However, it is 
very important to note when a government should negotiate with terrorists and insurgents. 
Professionals in negotiations claim that the best time to arrive to the peace talks is with a 
favorable position, in order to establish the conditions for negotiation and exercise, one 
way or another, additional pressure on the group that is negotiating. Thus, Colombia’s 
administrations have felt they were in a stronger position and inevitably decided to 
negotiate with the FARC. Despite having this favorable position, the government’s 
negotiations have ended in a stalemate, which is the usual occurrence in Colombia. The 
stalemate has also influenced the Santos government’s decision to negotiate with the 
FARC. The continuity of the stalemate could bring more years of war ahead, without any 
solution in sight, making the government think a negotiation is necessary.  
Should governments negotiate with the terrorists and insurgents? Yes. But the 
government should negotiate only when it is confident of its strong position in the 
negotiation. A privileged position can only be achieved if the terrorists and 
insurgents arrive weakened to the negotiations due to a permanent effort by military 
achievement from the government. One of the most memorable phrases of Benjamin 
Netanyahu explains this position: “Peace is purchased from strength. It’s not purchased 
from weakness or unilateral retreats.”207 Terrorists usually consider that when the 
government issues the first sign of a willingness to negotiate, this willingness is a sign of 
weakness. Therefore, no sign of weakness should be made apparent. On the contrary, the 
offensive must be kept in order to make terrorists think twice and request a negotiation with 
the government. Because Santos’s government was the first to engage with the will to 
negotiate, the FARC took advantage of this opportunity and came to the negotiations with a 
strengthened position necessary to achieve its ends from the government.  
                                                 
207 Bret Stephens, “Iran Is The Terrorist ‘Mother Regime,’” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2009, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123275466964911679.  
 91
VI. SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE ENEMY ARE 
IMPORTANT FACTORS TO AVOID THE RECURRENCE OF WAR 
On August 26, 2016, negotiators from the Colombian Government and the FARC 
announced in Havana, Cuba, that they had reached a final and definitive agreement to end 
their armed conflict.208 Later, the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, informed 
the Colombian population that more than 50 years of war with the FARC had come to an 
end. During this announcement, President Juan Manuel Santos informed the public about 
the agreement that had been reached during almost four years of negotiations. The 
agreement includes six main points:  
 Agricultural development policy 
 Political Participation 
 Ending the conflict 
 Solution to the problem of illicit drugs 
 Victims 
 Implementation and verification.209 
The Colombian Government and the FARC claimed that by abiding by these 
agreements, Colombia would be able to reach a stable and lasting peace. 
Ending the conflict was one of the most difficult points for the two parties to 
agree upon. The FARC agreed to lay down their arms and start the process of DDR, while 
the government would provide all necessary security conditions for the FARC to 
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reintegrate into society.210 The negotiators noted that personal safety was one of the 
factors that caused the FARC leadership to waver in their commitment to agree to end the 
conflict. This chapter demonstrates the importance of both sides abiding by the 
agreements. Therefore, special preference is made toward the physical security 
guarantees of the demobilized, because it is one the main worries of those 
demobilizing—the security dilemma. The armed forces have an obligation to ensure their 
physical security and reduce threats to those who have turned in their weapons. Game 
theory is used also in this chapter, to demonstrate why it is important for the government 
to provide enough security to those demobilizing and to abide by the agreements, 
specifically with regard to the guarantee of security. With this game theory model, the 
chapter demonstrates why it is more beneficial for both parties to act in accordance with 
the agreements ending the conflict than to violate them. 
A. THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
In the third point of the agreement, the FARC agreed to lay down their arms and 
start the process of DDR.211 This would begin reintegration into civilian life, and initiate 
their participation into politics without using weapons.212 The government for its part 
promises to provide all necessary security conditions for the FARC to be able to return to 
society and to participate in politics.213 Therefore, the Colombian government agrees to 
use its military and police forces to provide security to FARC members as they 
demobilize. The military will also assist with the reintegration of those demobilized back 
into Colombian society. This commitment by the Colombian government and its armed 
forces is required in order to fulfill the main objective of the agreements—to reach a 
stable and lasting peace in Colombia. Salomons mentions the importance of safety as a 
factor in recurrence in war: “The most important factor in ensuring non-recurrence of 
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hostilities is by establishing security. The basic need for freedom from violence is an 
absolute prerequisite for any effective post-conflict recovery process.”214 Thus, the 
military and police forces must make a serious effort to prevent any action that threatens 
the security of the FARC members. Threats to demobilized FARC members may come 
from other terrorist organizations that commit crimes in Colombia, or even from some 
members of the armed forces who disagree with the negotiated settlement between the 
Colombian government and the FARC. If violent actions against FARC members 
demobilizing can be avoided, the FARC would have less reason or excuse to take up 
arms to fight against the government again. 
The lack of personal security has been a negative aspect of previous peace 
agreements with some subversive and terrorist organizations in Colombia. The murder of 
guerrilla group members from previous agreements has caused doubt among current 
armed group members about whether to trust the government with protecting them once 
they have surrendered their weapons. For example, one of the most infamous cases in 
Colombia was the assassination of Guadalupe Salcedo, leader of the Liberal guerrillas in 
the Colombian plains during the time of “La Violencia” (1948–1958).215 Salcedo was 
assassinated in 1957, three years after having reached an agreement with General 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s government.216 The death of Salcedo and other leaders of the 
Liberal guerrillas forced some demobilized members to return to possession of weapons 
for personal protection, continuing the violence in Colombia. 
Another example is the demobilization of the rebel group EPL in the early 1990s 
in Colombia. The EPL reached an agreement with the government of President Cesar 
Gaviria.217 However, this agreement was regarded as a betrayal of the rebel cause by the 
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FARC, and the FARC killed almost 700 members of the demobilized EPL members.218 
There is also the case of Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, who demobilized from the guerrilla 
movement 19 de Abril (M-19).219 Pizarro was assassinated on April 26, 1989, months 
after his demobilization, while he was campaigning for the presidency of Colombia. His 
murder was carried out by an alliance between drug traffickers and right-wing groups in 
Colombia.220 
The potential lack of protection for demobilized members of the FARC is a strong 
risk to the peace settlement. Enzo Nussio, a senior researcher at the Center for Security 
Studies in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of St. Gallen 
(Switzerland), suggests: “The lack of physical security is one reason for the renewed 
violence, as demobilized are exposed to threats of old enemies or attracted by former 
colleagues to join again to his troops or new illegal groups.”221 Failures in the protection 
of those demobilizing has led some ex-combatants to prefer returning to guerrilla or 
terrorist organizations, resulting in the recurrence in war. Similarly, these flaws in the 
physical protection of those demobilized have generated distrust toward government 
institutions, creating a state of vulnerability. This state of vulnerability has been called by 
some scholars “the security dilemma” for those who are planning to demobilize. 
The security dilemma, when a civil war has taken place, refers to the various fears 
that groups negotiating face in trusting each other. For those demobilizing, one of their 
fears would be the inability to defend themselves against a possible attack from an old 
enemy or enemies who appear during the stage of demobilization and reintegration, since 
they do not have a weapon to defend themselves and ensure their own survival. Caroline 
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Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, write about these fears: “In the absence of assurances that 
the processes of disarmament or reorganization will not leave them vulnerable to future 
aggression, parties to the conflict often prove reluctant to either reach or honor negotiated 
settlements.”222 Yet, these fears are not only faced by those who want to demobilize; the 
government and its institutions also harbor similar fears. In this sense, the government 
expects that the subversive or terrorist groups who have promised to disarm and 
demobilize will comply. The FARC has shown commitment to their contribution to 
effectively build and consolidate the path towards peace in everything that is within their 
capabilities. The FARC must respect the fundamental rights of all Colombian inhabitants, 
and ensure the legitimate monopoly of force and the use of weapons is held by the State 
throughout its sovereign territory while guaranteeing the non-recurrence of violence. 
Trust between both sides comes into play during the post-conflict period. 
Nevertheless, trust is hard to come by after so many years of war, so the security dilemma 
arises. Peter Wallensteen says: “The parties who sign the agreements are likely to be 
highly suspicious of each other, with good reason. In their agitation, they have often 
emphasized that the other side is criminal, illegitimate, corrupt and untrustworthy.”223 
The restoration of trust between the parties is a long and fragile process. Any incident, 
regardless of how small it may be, can be perceived as an act of provocation by one side 
to the other. The agreements reached under such circumstances might be unsustainable. 
The fragility of the agreements is explained by Dr. Gordon McCormick, Professor in the 
Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Distinguished 
Professor Dr. Guillermo Owen, of the Department of Applied Mathematics at the Naval 
Postgraduate School: “With each side unwilling to trust the other, fighting is often the 
best of a bad set of options.”224 By guaranteeing the physical protection of the 
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demobilizing members, the government can offer the first sign of its commitment to the 
agreement and a firm step towards achieving a stable and lasting peace. 
B. TO ABIDE BY OR NOT ABIDE BY THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY 
AND DISARMAMENT 
A finite two-person general-sum game can be expressed as a pair of m x n 
matrices, A=(aij) and B=(bij), or equivalently, as an m x n matrix (A,B) 
each of those entries is an ordered pair (aij,bij). The entries aij and bij are 
the payoffs (in utilities) to the players I and II, respectively.225 
The decision to abide or not abide by the agreements made in a negotiated 
settlement depends on the benefits or payoffs that can be received by the parties involved. 
For example, if the benefits of acting in accordance with the agreements outweigh the 
benefits gained from not acting in accordance with them, a rational actor will choose the 
option of abiding by the agreements. Conversely, if the profits of not abiding by the 
agreements outweigh the benefits or payoffs of abiding by such agreements, a rational 
actor would choose not to abide by them. Martin Peterson, Associate Professor of 
Philosophy at the Royal institute of Technology, Sweden, explains what a rational 
decision is: “If and only if the decision maker chooses to do what she has most reason to 
do at the point in time at which the decision is made.226  
This section employs game theory in order to understand which decision would be 
more beneficial to each of the parties, the Colombian government and the FARC. This 
approach enables the reader to understand whether each side would act in accordance with 
the agreements. Although a final agreement was reached between the Colombian 
government and the FARC, this game theory model emphasizes the third point of the 
agreement—ending the conflict. 
Game theory is the study of how players should rationally act in a given set of 
circumstances and choices of action.227 Each player would like the game to end in an 
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outcome giving him the largest payoff possible.228 Game theory allows a player or 
representative to analyze from a set of strategies or gambling options available, which 
one turns out to be more beneficial or is the most likely to give him an advantage over his 
opponent.229 Two types of games are most commonly used for testing the decision-
making process. The first is a two-person zero-sum game, which is defined by 
mathematician Guillermo Owen as: “a game in which everything that someone wins must 
be lost by someone else.”230 That is to say, one player chooses a strategy that allows him 
to get everything the opponent will lose. The second is a two-person non-zero-sum game. 
Professor of Mathematics at Beloit College, Philip Straffin, explains that in this type of 
game “the interests of the two players are not strictly opposed, and not strictly 
coincidence.”231 Therefore, both players decide to pursue strategies that permit them to 
benefit together, without the benefits being the same for both, but at the end satisfactory 
for both. The two-person non-zero-sum game will be used to analyze which would be the 
best decision to be taken by the Colombian government and the FARC—to act or not to 
act in accordance with the agreements for ending the conflict.  
Four strategies are presented as possible decisions that could be taken by the 
Colombian government (G) and the FARC (F) before the agreement of a bilateral 
ceasefire. Therefore, each strategy offers a payoff from one (1) to four (4), according to 
the benefits received with a specific strategy. Four (4) will be the highest value for a 
specific strategy adopted, while one (1) will be the lowest payoff.  
G1= the Colombian government uses the armed forces and the police to prevent 
any kind of threat against the members of FARC who demobilize.  
G2= the Colombian government does not abide by the ceasefire and decides to 
use the armed forces against the FARC when they concentrate and can be destroyed.  
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F1= FARC abides by the ceasefire, turns in all weapons, and demobilizes all its 
members. 
F2= FARC does not abide by the ceasefire, and uses the concentration zones to 
reorganize and attack the government in order to achieve its main objective of 
overthrowing the government and establishing a communist regime.  
In Table 1, it can be seen what the assumptions and possible outcomes are for 
each one of the parties, the Colombian government and the FARC, when they choose a 
specific strategy in order to understand why the values are assigned as the payoffs. 
Table 1.   Possible Outcomes 
Colombian Government (G) FARC (F) 
G1F1=4 The agreements are respected and trusted 
between the parties. This trust allows for 
paving the way for “stable and lasting 
peace.” Respect for the agreements would 
bring greater international support for the 
post-conflict period. 
G1F1=4 The agreements are respected and 
trusted between the parties. This trust 
allows for paving the way for “stable 
and lasting peace.” Respect for the 
agreements would bring greater 
international support for the post-
conflict period. 
G1F2=3 The Colombian government receives more 
international support to fight against 
terrorism and to defeat the FARC 
militarily. 
G2F1=3 FARC would receive legitimacy 
from the international community. 
G2F2=2 The Colombian government returns to the 
counterinsurgency strategy and the war 
continues.  
G2F2=2 FARC returns to guerrilla warfare. 
The war continues. 
G2F1=1 The Colombian government would receive 
international condemnation; likewise, the 
international community would reduce its 
financial support to Colombia. 
G1F2=1 FARC loses any political rights 
achieved; likewise, it would lose the 
support of the civilian population. 
 
In Table 2, interactions can be seen between the Colombian government and the 
FARC. The numbers on the left of each square represent the values or payoffs that the 
Colombian government could obtain if the decision shown is adopted. The numbers on 
the right represent the payoffs obtained by the FARC based on this type of decision. The 
strategy G1 for the Colombian government would be the preferred strategy, since it gives 
the highest payoff (4) that can be obtained. Meanwhile, F1 is shown as the preferred 
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strategy for the FARC, obtaining the highest value (4). Therefore, it can be seen that the 
first row (G1) dominates the second row (G2), and also that the first column (F1) 
dominates the second column (F2). Consequently, both players should use G1F1—abide 
by—act in accordance with guarantees of security. Thus, G1F1 is a pure strategy. A pure 
strategy means: “Players can either play only one of their available strategies or they can 
play some mixture of strategies. If the players’ optimal strategy is to play only one 
strategy, this is called a pure strategy solution or solution in the pure strategies.”232  
Hence, for both players, the Colombian government and the FARC, it is evident 
that the optimal strategy is to play G1F1. A Nash equilibrium can also be observed in 
Table 2. A Nash equilibrium “is an equilibrium point that is [a set of strategies] such that 
each player’s … strategy maximizes his pay-off if the strategy of the others are held 
fixed.”233 Thus, each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the other.234 
Therefore, G1F1 is in Nash equilibrium because if the Colombian government 
knows that the FARC is going to abide by the agreements, then the Colombian 
government would not benefit by moving to another strategy; and if the FARC knows 
that the Colombian government is going to abide by the agreements, then the FARC 
would also benefit by not switching its strategy.  
The equilibrium can be also found using a movement diagram. Mathematician 
William Fox explains the movement diagram: “For the Row player’s values draw an 
arrow in each column from the smaller value to the larger value. For the Column player’s 
value, draw an arrow from the smaller value to the larger value on each row.”235 Thus, if 
more than one arrow points to an outcome, there is a pure strategy solution.236 In Table 2 
can be seen red arrows and blue arrows. These arrows represent the movements of the 
Colombian government and the FARC, respectively. Therefore, the Colombian 
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government G2 is smaller than G1 in F1, so the arrow goes from G2 to G1. G2 is smaller 
than G1 in F2, so the arrow goes from G2 to G1. For the FARC, F2 is smaller than F1 in 
G1, so the arrow goes from F2 to F1. In G2, F2 is smaller than F1, so the arrow goes 
from F2 to F1. Then, it can be observed that more than one arrow points to an outcome, 
in this case G1F1. Thus, G1F1 is a pure strategy solution. 
Table 2.   Movement Diagram 
 
 
Based on the condition that an agreement has already been achieved between the 
Colombian government and the FARC, it can be assumed that the parties are determined 
to cooperate with each other in order to obtain the best payoffs for both. Therefore, in a 
case like this it is important that both players have complete information; that means, 
each player must know that the result— Abide by G1—Abide by F1— is the best for 
both. Mathematician Guillermo Owen explains the importance of the cooperation in a 
game: “Cooperation between the players can work out to both players’ advantage.”237 
Therefore,, the Colombian government must explain to the FARC what the government’s 
objectives would be, and why the FARC should not mistrust the government’s 
commitment and should abide by the ceasefire. In this case, the Colombian government’s 
objective will be to guarantee the personal security for each one of FARC’s demobilized 
members. Likewise, the government must communicate the consequences if the FARC 
fails to abide by the ceasefire. Whichever party does not fulfill its part will suffer 
international opprobrium, as mentioned in the assumptions. 
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Pareto optimal analysis is another tool presented in game theory to determine 
whether there is a better outcome or decision to choose in a game. Straffin says that “an 
outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no such other outcome.”238 The way to see if a 
result is a Pareto optimal is by plotting the outcomes in a coordinate plane (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Payoff Polygon for Game 
In this plane, the horizontal axis represents the payoffs obtained by the FARC. 
Meanwhile, the vertical axis represents the payoffs obtained by the Colombian 
government. The Pareto optimal outcomes are exactly those that lie on the “northeast” 
boundary of the payoff polygon.239 As can be appreciated from Figure 1, this boundary 
is located at the number 4 on the horizontal axis, and at the number 4 on the vertical axis. 
Therefore, the best result for both the Colombian government and the FARC is Abide 
by—Abide by.  
C. CONCLUSIONS  
Colombia has suffered from war for more than 50 years. The Colombian 
government and the FARC have inflicted pain on each other during the conflict. 
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Therefore, trust between these two is precarious. Peace processes are long and 
complicated; however, they offer an appropriate means to start building trust. The way in 
which the peace agreement has been reached between the Colombian government and the 
FARC has not been easy, and its implementation will likely be even more difficult. The 
hardest task for the military during the implementation of the agreement will be to keep 
the FARC demobilized and in a position in which they will neither have nor need their 
weapons for self-protection. Thus, the demobilized FARC must feel that the Colombian 
Armed Forces is fulfilling its constitutional obligation and is able to provide adequate 
protection. However, it is important to remember that this protection should not only be 
for demobilized persons, but for all Colombians. 
The game theory model demonstrated the importance of abiding by the third point 
of the peace agreements—ending the conflict. It is important that the Colombian 
government uses its military and police forces properly to provide protection to the 
demobilized. The proper enforcement of protecting the demobilized allows reinforcement 
of the bridges of trust that have been built during the last four years of negotiations. As 
presented in the game theory model, abiding by the agreements will allow the Colombian 
government to obtain better benefits, not only nationally, but also internationally. 
Nationally, the most important result is to prevent the recurrence of war. Therefore, 
mitigating the reasons why the FARC may feel vulnerable and should reduce the 
possibility of their return to the use of weapons for self-protection and protest. Not 
abiding by agreements has been the norm in most of the peace processes in Colombia. 
Therefore, it has been one of the biggest obstacles to peace. Not abiding by the agreement 
has fueled more violence and increased the distrust between the terrorists and the state. 
Nevertheless, abiding by the agreements is a prerequisite for building permanent trust. 
The latter responsibility belongs to the government and the FARC members. The 
Colombian military forces meanwhile must continue assuring their place in Colombian 
history. First, the armed forces were the institution that was able to reduce the FARC 
threat and make them reach the point to negotiate with the government. Last, as the 
guarantors of peace, while abiding by the agreements, they support Colombia’s eventual 
achievement of a stable and lasting peace. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
What are the factors for successful and failed transitions to peace after a 
negotiated settlement, and how can the Colombian Marines backed by the U.S. Armed 
Forces support civil authorities to sustain the peace and avoid the recurrence of intrastate 
conflict? 
In the course of this study, the authors found that achievement of a negotiated 
peace settlement is difficult; however, it brings hope to a war-torn nation and can support 
the more difficult goal of achieving an enduring peace. Initially an environment of hope 
prevails once an agreement is reached. If expectations held by the parties to the 
agreement are not met; however, the ideal of hope can disappear during the period of 
implementation. During the implementation process, signs of diminished motivation can 
begin to emerge when parties realize the difficulties that must be overcome to see goals 
materialize from the agreement.  
Based upon the research and analysis from this study, the authors determined the 
factors that contribute to the renewal of hostilities and the factors that help to sustain the 
peace. Therefore, the following negative factors contributing to the recurrence of internal 
conflict should be addressed for sustainable peace: 1) political exclusion; 2) coercion; 3) 
ethnic discrimination; 4) economic grievances; 5) weak states; 6) greed; and 7) 
destruction from previous civil war. The following factors could potentially make the 
implementation of the negotiated settlement a success. Therefore, the positive factors for 
application need the greatest focus, including: 1) power sharing; 2) peace building; and 3) 
economic development. By working to negate the negative factors, the government can 
allow the positive factors to take hold and sustain the peace.  
These factors are described in detail in this study and are influential in the onset 
of intrastate conflict. Therefore, during the negotiation process, commonly proposed 
solutions to mitigate these factors should be generated to mitigate against the possibility 
of the onset of a renewed intrastate conflict. Thus, in a post-conflict period the goal of 
reducing the negative factors to the point of extinction is the optimal solution to achieve a 
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lasting and stable peace. However, when any of those negative factors persists during and 
after the post-conflict period, some spoilers will have the excuse to take up arms in 
protest to achieve their political or economic ends. 
The immediate recommendation for sustaining the peace after a conflict period is 
to defer the risk of physical harm to former combatants. Previous experience in Colombia 
has proved this threat is real and can lead to the recurrence of hostilities. An example is 
the murder of former demobilized combatants after the negotiated settlement with the 
government led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in the 1950s, which ultimately led to 
political violence in Colombia. More recently was the murder of demobilized members of 
the EPL by the FARC in the 1990s. The most difficult task for the military during the 
implementation of the agreements will be to keep demobilized FARC combatants safe 
and without the need to possess personal weapons for protection. Furthermore, successful 
disarmament will rely on intelligence specifying all weapons caches and with an accurate 
inventory of the number and condition of weapons. Thus, demobilized combatants must 
feel that the Colombian Armed Forces is fulfilling its constitutional obligation and is 
adequately protecting them. If proper conditions of security are provided to demobilized 
FARC combatants or any other group that wishes to demobilize, the likelihood for 
recurrence of hostilities is considerably decreased. By emphasizing the physical safety 
and security of demobilized combatants, the government can reduce political exclusion or 
the perception of political exclusion on the part of segments of demobilized combatants. 
Moreover, protection should not only be for demobilized combatants, but for all 
Colombians.  
The term “post conflict” has recently been embedded in the Colombian national 
discourse. This is due in part to negotiations that have taken place between the 
Colombian government and the FARC in Havana, Cuba. At the same time that there has 
been an increased desire for peace in Colombia, there is much speculation over the future 
role of the armed forces during the post-conflict era. Some people insist on the need to 
reduce the size of the armed forces, including the Colombian Marines, as well as to 
decrease its operational budget, arguing that in Colombia there will no longer be any 
more armed insurgencies. The argument is invalid, though, when considering the security 
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environment in Colombia. The FARC is not the only illegal armed group committing 
atrocities against the Colombian government and civilian population. This study 
demonstrates the strong need for the military to play a role in both security sector reform 
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. 
The leadership in the Colombian Ministry of Defense and senior political officials 
will soon decide on reforms giving recognition to the future role and mission of the 
Colombian Marines. Although the negotiated peace agreement with the FARC, once 
ratified by the Colombian people, would mean a reduction in violence, the environment 
of insecurity will inevitably persist. The reason lies with continuing hostilities invoked by 
other armed groups that threaten stability and security in the country. 
The groups once called “criminal bands” (BACRIM) are now separated 
into two groups: Armed Organized Groups (GAO) and Armed Delinquent 
Organizations (DAO). The categorization is supported by two new 
directives from Colombia’s Ministry of Defense, numbers 15 and 16, 
regarding the circumstances under which the military can legitimately use 
force against armed groups consistent with international law. Colombia 
has identified three criminal organizations that fall into these categories: 
the Gulf Clan (formerly known as the Úsuga, and prior to that, the 
Urabeños), the Pelusos, and the Puntilleros (a group descended from the 
ERPAC). Consistent with the new designation, in November 2015, the 
Colombian Air Force bombarded an encampment of the Gulf Clan. The 
new directives also establish a legally defensible framework in which 
other groups who are currently considered mere delinquent organizations 
could be designated “Armed Organized Groups” in the future.240 
Therefore, there is a strong possibility that if the DDR program is not successful 
at reintegrating demobilized members, they will revert to activities they are most 
accustomed to in order to sustain themselves. These income-generating activities tend to 
center on illicit activities tied to the drug trade, which may lead to rearming and forming 
new criminal groups in alliance with existing organizations. Therefore, demobilizing 
FARC members may fall back on what they know best, including the use of intimidation 
and the profitable pursuits in the drug trade to provide funding for nefarious activities. To 
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combat organized criminal groups, the military needs to continue to provide much needed 
support to the Colombian National Police, especially in rural and poorer areas remote 
from the principle urban centers.  
This study demonstrates the need for a country like Colombia, where internal and 
external threats converge, to maintain strong military forces. The transition to a post-
conflict society does not mean an immediate change in the role played or support that has 
been provided by the Colombian Marines to the National Police. With that stated, 
continued support by the Colombian Marines to police forces in their area of operations 
will reduce future acts of coercion in these former rebel-held areas. Without fear of 
coercion, citizens will be able to participate equally in the Colombian political system, 
which is one of the positive factors for sustaining the peace—”political inclusion.” The 
improved level of security will also allow for economic investment, which supports 
another positive factor. When economic development takes hold in the remote areas of 
Colombia and the potential for better job opportunities persists, the negative factor of 
economic grievance will be diminished. After these factors are addressed in the post-
conflict environment, the possibility of renewal of conflict will be considerably reduced 
and the responsibility for public security can revert to the National Police Force. The 
Colombian Marines can then resume their constitutional mission, “to defend the 
independence and integrity of the national sovereign territory while maintaining 
constitutional order.”241 
The Colombian Marines have to initiate a process of transformation and gradually 
take on its most vital role in the defense of the nation. This adaptation to a new role in the 
post-conflict period must be gradual, and it must not erase institutional experience and 
knowledge gained from irregular warfare. Colombia needs to preserve and share its 
successful experience against its internal adversaries through education and training to 
allied nations, enabling the exportation of security.  
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A. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR 
The best solution for Colombia is force transformation by focusing on shaping the 
force, enhancing existing capabilities, and supporting modern training initiatives. 
Colombia will continue to need security to support the implementation of peace efforts 
and economic recovery policies. It will require time and a sustained effort by the nation 
of Colombia and its most important security ally the United States. The security needs of 
the nation are assessed to be one of the greatest concerns leading to a durable peace. 
While the military and police forces will need to be ready and able to ensure stability and 
security, reforms must be instituted to reflect the changing environment. In the post-
conflict environment, the military forces will be required to transition from engaging in a 
brutal internal conflict to supporting efforts for peace. However, the military’s capability 
to wage irregular warfare must be maintained to combat any future internal recurrence of 
conflict and the multiple illicit organizations not a part of the peace process.  
The following argues that continual refinement of the holistic, long-term strategy 
is needed to refocus the efforts of the Colombian Marines from the immediate threat of 
combating internally armed insurgent groups to organized crime organizations. 
Additionally, roles supporting law enforcement will center on countering weapons 
smuggling, and eventually developing a crisis response force equipped to advise and 
assist police institutions. This process of building capacity and then transferring authority 
will be slow and costly, but eventually will allow the armed forces to remain a 
professional, specialized, and apolitical instrument of national security policy.  
During the post-conflict period, the Colombian Marines will undoubtedly 
continue to support the National Police to fight against illicit organizations profiting from 
the drug trade. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicates that the number 
of coca crops in Colombia increased significantly, from 69,000 hectares in 2014 to 
96,000 hectares in 2015, representing an increase of 39 percent, and the numbers are 
continuing to rise.242 A stable and lasting peace will only be achieved by effectively 
reducing profits from illicit activities. The Colombian Armed Forces’ support to civil 
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authorities to combat this issue is termed operation, “Sword of Honor,” which is 
described as:  
a counterinsurgency effort launched by the Colombian Armed Forces in 
2012 to confront and defeat illegal groups nationwide. Under the initiative, 
soldiers combat terrorist attacks, dismantle landmines, and persuade 
hundreds of guerrillas to demobilize and enroll in a government program 
that provides them with training so they can enter the workforce and 
peacefully rejoin civil society.243 
By reducing funding streams from the drug trade, the Colombian Armed Forces 
can effectively control its sovereign territory. The Colombian Marines future functions 
once the peace agreement with the FARC is approved will continue to include anti-
criminal efforts. The Colombian Marines in the post-peace agreement era will need to 
transition from a military to one of the most vital institutions in Colombia’s state capacity 
at the forefront of the war on organized crime.  
B. EVOLVING ROLES OF COLOMBIAN MARINES 
The evolving roles of the Colombian Marines are taking shape, though some still 
need careful planning and consideration. As previously mentioned, supporting civilian 
authorities against organized criminal organizations will continue to be a focus area in 
order to achieve internal security. Another effort after the peace deal is reached will be to 
support the DDR process by securing FARC assembly areas and preparing to fight a 
possible recurrence of conflict by armed groups that want to overthrow the government. 
Another hope for Colombia is to avert institutional “brain drain” by preserving all tactics, 
techniques, and procedures learned by its forces to combat the FARC and ELN. Sharing 
this valuable knowledge and experience through education and training activities with 
other Latin American allies will also enable Colombia to “export security.” The 
following are recommendations beyond fighting organized crime, supporting the SSR, 
and preserving experience fighting the counterinsurgency. These recommendations are 
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aimed at senior officials of the Colombian Navy and Marines for consideration for the 
post-conflict period.  
The Colombian Marines cannot give up the capabilities to face an unconventional 
enemy. The Colombian Marines have acquired many skills over many years of internal 
conflict. In any scenario, the state and the Colombian people will continue to need the 
efforts, performance, and readiness of the Colombian Armed Forces, not only to defend 
the territory, but to ensure the country’s economic development, by safeguarding the 
democracy and protecting natural resources.  
A main reason why illicit organizations in Colombia have taken advantage of the 
drug trade is the weakness of territorial security on the borders. When planning a 
transformation process of the Colombian Marines in the post-conflict period, officials 
must consider an adaptive role for these forces to conduct operations against internal 
threats, external threats, and transnational threats. Therefore, the transformation and 
restructuring of the Colombian Marines should be focused on the relocation of military 
units to exercise better control on the borders and reduce the economic advantages of 
terrorist and criminal organizations. Strengthened border control necessarily requires 
bilateral agreements of security cooperation with other states. This in effect takes 
advantage of the capabilities of other nations and increases Colombia’s capability to 
confront transnational threats, direct or indirect, that affect all countries with which 
Colombia shares a border and the broader western hemisphere. For example, the U.S. 
Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement could partner with Colombia 
to establish a partnership with the Marines to enhance control over Colombia’s sovereign 
territory by using similar capabilities for patrolling borders, rivers, and coastlines using 
the latest tactics, techniques, and technologies.  
The U.S. and Colombian Marines should develop a stronger military-to-military 
partnership for investment in Colombia’s efforts to preserve counterinsurgency 
capabilities. These capabilities can be exported to other nations experiencing intrastate 
conflicts and could reduce the rise in such conflicts. This endeavor could be achieved 
through the development of a tactical training center such as the one built in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan called the King Abdullah Special Operations Training 
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Center. The center in Colombia would be a “Center for Colombian Counter-Insurgency 
Lessons Learned” and along with tactical training would further support writing doctrine 
and the exportation of lessons to other Latin American countries, serving as way for the 
United States to export security via Colombia. 
Last, Colombia needs to increase its capacity for building large-scale works 
projects such as those mentioned in the Angola chapter, taking advantage of the nation’s 
natural resources to develop its economy. Perhaps the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, an 
agency within the Department of Defense that works to build domestic projects, could be 
mirrored as a solution for Colombia’s post-conflict development. This hybrid civilian-
military agency could take advantage of Colombia’s most trusted government agency, the 
military, and increase its civilian support for public works projects, thereby creating the 
environment for economic and political inclusion. This would diminish the possibility for 
a renewed conflict and increase potential for economic development.  
C. FORCE ENHANCEMENT  
In the post-peace process era, although a military drawdown maybe inevitable, the 
force will need enhancing for the military to achieve necessary reforms toward better 
benefits and increased prestige. To modernize the military and further advance goals, we 
suggest the following actions: increase pay to a competitive living wage to discourage 
desertion; make intermediate and advanced training more dynamic to encourage military 
service members to seek advancement within the service; and instill respect and long-
term loyalty to the nation and departments by providing tangible and lasting benefits, 
such as targeted incentive bonuses, better pensions, and improved health care. 
Additionally, steps need to be taken to prevent those transitioning out of military service 
from being recruited by drug cartels and illicit organizations. Job placement and 
transition services need to link military veterans with opportunities in the private sector 
or in government jobs. Otherwise, some former soldiers may choose to join organized 
crime groups, taking military skills with them.  
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As Colombia transitions from fighting with the FARC, it is the perfect time to 
consider security sector reform that transforms the Marines into an adaptive force for a 
new era. The reevaluation of troop levels provides an opportunity to shift funding to 
transformation efforts, which ensures the security needs of Colombia are met. The efforts 
and investment required to transform Colombia’s military organization and equipment, 
with a renewed focus on improvement and enablement of civilian public security 
elements, will prove to be difficult. It will be important to capture even the smallest 
incremental improvements made during this transition; thus, short- and long-term metrics 
must be established and continually reevaluated.  
This study argued that a secure environment is necessary for political and 
economic well-being in Colombia’s post- conflict era. The security of the nation can be 
accomplished by the Colombian Marines with support in the form of aid and advice from 
the United States. As Colombia’s key security ally, the United States should continue to 
provide security, training, and aid in rebuilding infrastructure. For a sustainable peace to 
take hold, Colombia’s Armed Forces and National Police must transform to meet the 
needs of the new environment in a timely manner. The following are recommendations 
and their corresponding factors to support the Colombian Marines with the backing of the 
U.S. Military to transform into a post-conflict era force and to sustain the peace: 
1. Ensure security to ex-combatants to avoid physical harm throughout the 
DDR process. Special emphasis should be placed on the reintegration 
phase to emphasize the perception of trust and security provided by 
government forces, negating ex-combatants’ need for personal weapons: 
Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding.  
2. Ensure excellent intelligence in the post-conflict era to avert 
misinformation on location of FARC weapon caches, with exact number 
of arms and expected condition: Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping 
& Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factor of Coercion. 
3. Develop a Rewards for Arms Program, incentivizing the turn-in of 
weapons used by ex-combatants and civilians with actionable intelligence: 
Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, while 
avoiding the Negative Factors of Coercion, Weak States, and Greed. 
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4. Ensure continuity of support from the Colombian Marines to the National 
Police: Supports Positive Factors of Economic Development and Power-
Sharing, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States, Coercion, 
and Political Exclusion;  
5. Ensure the continuity of lessons learned by developing an Irregular 
Warfare Training Center and Doctrinal Command—partnering with U.S. 
Special Operations for financial and advisory assistance to mirror the King 
Abdullah Special Operations Training Center constructed in Jordan: 
Supports Positive Factor of Economic Development, while avoiding all 
the Negative Factors from the onset and Recurrence of War.  
6. Achieve force transformation: 
(a) Reduce forces in order to enhance benefits to existing forces.  
(b) Create Job Placement Center for transitioning service members to 
government and private sector to avoid skilled service members 
deserting to organized criminal organizations: Supports Positive 
Factor of Economic Development.  
7. Protect natural resources to avoid the increase in funding channels to 
insurgent groups and organized criminal organizations: Supports Positive 
Factors of Economic Development and Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, 
while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States, Greed, and Economic 
Grievances. 
8. Protect major works projects to support economic development: Supports 
Positive Factors of Economic Development and Peacekeeping & 
Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States and 
Economic Grievances.  
9. Ensure greater border security:  
(a) Partner with U.S. Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement for enhanced capability: Supports Positive Factor of 
Economic Development, while avoiding the Negative Factors of 
Weak States, Greed, and Economic Grievances.  
The United States should aid and support in implementing these recommendations 
during this transformational process. The U.S. Military should support Colombia with 
foreign aid, credit to purchase up to date weaponry, and send U.S. personnel to advise 
and assist in reconstruction efforts. For a sustainable peace to take hold, 
USSOUTHCOM—working as an interagency command—should conduct a full 
assessment in conjunction with the American Embassy in Bogota, and the 
USMILGROUP should collaborate with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to determine 
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all possible support to transition from conflict to peace. With support from the United 
States, Colombia’s security institutions, i.e., the Armed Forces and National Police, must 
transform to meet the needs of the new environment. By continuing to ensure a strong 
security environment, the political and economic well-being of Colombia’s post- conflict 
era can be strengthened. 
The Colombian Marines should concentrate their efforts on SSR and DDR, but 
eventually progress into preserving and building upon lessons learned through the 
counterinsurgency for the exportation of security. These efforts will help to ensure peace 
by establishing a more secure nation; thus, it is in the best interest of the United States 
Armed Forces and inter-agencies to help post-conflict Colombia reform for the benefit of 
sustaining the peace.  
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